



CORPORATE EVALUATION

Mid-term Evaluation of EBRD Strategic and Capital Framework 2021-25

Technical Report: Learning culture, knowledge management and use of evaluation at EBRD

IEvD ID: SS24-180



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Contents

Abbreviation.....	i
Technical report summary	ii
A. Results achieved over the period 2021-23	ii
B. Suggestions for improvement.....	iii
1. Introduction	1
2. Background and context.....	3
2.1. The ambition of SCF 2021-25 on results, knowledge management and learning culture	3
2.2. Cascading of SCF's LKM priorities into SIPs, sector and country strategies	3
3. Key findings: Building a true learning culture across the EBRD is a work in progress.....	6
3.1. Slow progress on building a learning culture and strengthening knowledge management.....	6
3.2. Good progress in Results Management, but effects pending	12
3.3. Progress in re-building the self-evaluation system has been slow and remains incomplete	14
3.4. Using evaluation to inform decision-making is improving, but not yet systematic	17
4. Insights and suggestions	20
4.1. Key insights	20
4.2. Suggestions for further improvement.....	21
ANNEXES.....	24
Annex 1. LKM ambition in SCF and its cascading into SIPs, sector and country strategies	24
Annex 2. Proposed self-evaluation system in SIP 2022-2024	34
Annex 3. MOPAN assessment of EBRD	35

Abbreviation

ADB	Asian Development Bank	TOC	Theory of Change
AI	Artificial intelligence	TOMs	Transition Objectives Measurement System
APQC	American Productivity and Quality Center	TQ	Transition Quality
COI	Compendium of Indicators	VP3	Vice Presidency Policy and Partnerships
DFF	Direct Finance Framework		
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		
ETI	Expected Transition Impact		
ExCom	Executive Committee		
GET	Green Economy Transition		
HROD	Human Resources and Organisational Development		
IAD	Internal Audit Department		
IEvD	Independent Evaluation Department		
IFC	International Finance Corporation		
IFIs	International Financial Institutions		
IPAM	Independent Project Accountability Mechanism		
IT	Information Technology		
KM	Knowledge Management		
LKM	Learning and Knowledge Management		
MAP	Management Action Plan		
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks and Evaluation		
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network		
SCF	Strategic and Capital Framework		
SEU	Self-Evaluation Unit		
SIP	Strategy Implementation Plan		
SMEs	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises		
SPA	Summary Project Assessment		
TC	Technical Cooperation		
TCRS	Technical Cooperation Reporting System		
TIMS	Transition Impact Monitoring System		

Technical report summary

A. Results achieved over the period 2021-23

Key evaluation insights

- **The Strategic and Capital Framework (SCF) 2021-2025 for the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) includes a strategic ambition to strengthen the results framework, learning and knowledge management (LKM) and the use of evaluation findings to improve operations.**
- **The Bank has made some progress towards its LKM ambitions, although it is limited. The most serious omission is the lack of a developed value proposition for LKM.**
- **Resources allocated to LKM actions in 2021-23 do not match the ambition of the SCF.** An institutional focal point for LKM has been created within the Vice Presidency Policy and Partnerships (VP3), though it is small, with a focus on the Client Services Group and relies mostly on donor resources.
- **Progress has also been limited due to shifting priorities and resource constraints.** Influential factors include an understandable strategic shift in priorities due to multiple crises, a lack of a champion for LKM at the Executive Committee (ExCom) level and limited resources allocated to LKM, with some exceptions.
- **The Human Resources department has undertaken several initiatives to advance LKM,** including organisational changes and talent development. However, not all staff are fully utilising these tools.
- **The EBRD has made strides in transition impact measurement (Transition Impact Monitoring System (TIMs)),** but challenges remain in operationalising the Transition Qualities (TQs) and capturing broader systemic changes.
- **A new project self-evaluation system ‘owned’ and run by Management is being rolled out in 2024 after several years of preparatory work.** It remains to be seen whether it will deliver on its intention to contribute significantly to learning.
- **As highlighted by a recent internal audit report, the use of evaluation (both “independent” and “self-evaluation”/“evaluation by Management”) to inform decision-making remains limited and with serious potential risks for the EBRD.** This is despite the fact that the incorporation of lessons is potentially the most influential channel by which evaluations are used. Plus, the adoption of independent evaluation recommendations or suggestions is another influential channel for Independent Evaluation Department’s (IEvD) work to be useful and used. Herein lies an area of untapped potential.

B. Suggestions for improvement

- To enhance its strategic relevance and performance, **the EBRD should determine its future LKM ambition. This includes clarifying objectives, an implementation plan, an incentive mechanism and the resources needed.**
- To provide a full picture of its performance, **the EBRD should develop a robust self-evaluation system that is validated by IEvD. This would cover both standalone operations and operations under frameworks, enabling an effective feedback loop.**
- To improve the effectiveness of EBRD's activities while maximising efficiency gains, **the Bank should identify innovative and cost-effective channels to systematically incorporate lessons, insights and findings from both independent evaluation and evaluation by Management (including self-evaluation) into the decision-making process.**
- To foster a stronger culture of learning and innovation, **the EBRD should encourage, resource and incentivise all staff to learn, create, share and integrate knowledge, insights and lessons more systematically into their work.**

1. Introduction

1. This technical report is one of five prepared as part of IEvD's 2024 Mid-term Evaluation of the Bank's SCF,¹ covering the first three years of implementation (2021-23).
2. **Its objective is to assess the progress of the SCF's aspiration to strengthen EBRD's results framework, knowledge management (KM) and learning culture.** It covers internal learnings by the EBRD, including via self-evaluation, and it does not extend to knowledge shared by the Bank with clients and external stakeholders. That said, becoming a learning organisation that effectively captures and manages its knowledge will significantly enhance EBRD's ability to project its knowledge to the outside world. This paper covers results/impact to some extent as they are linked organisationally, and (non)availability of data on results is important element of organisational learning.
3. **The methodological approach uses IEvD's 2021 corporate evaluation of LKM as its base,² building on its findings and assessing progress against its recommendations and progress on its implementation of the Management Action Plan (MAP).** supplemented by new evidence illustrating progress in delivering SCF ambitions on LKM. This is essential as neither SCF nor the Strategy Implementation Plan (SIP) in 2021-23 contain matrix that can be used to assess progress.
4. **Learning, as generally defined by international financial institutions (IFIs) and consulting firms, is the continuous process by which an organisation acquires, develops and transfers knowledge, skills and insights to improve its operations and achieve its strategic objectives.** This process involves both the accumulation of knowledge and the critical assessment and application of that knowledge to drive innovation and performance (Box 1).

Box 1: Definitions of knowledge management and organisational learning

Knowledge management (KM) is the explicit and systematic management of processes enabling vital individual and collective knowledge resources to be identified, created and curated to retain relevance and stored, shared and used for benefit.

Organisational learning (OL) is the ability of an organisation to gain knowledge from experience through experimentation, observation, analysis and a willingness to examine both successes and failures, and to then use that knowledge to innovate and do things differently. Organisational learning has occurred when an organisation has become collectively more knowledgeable and skilful in pursuing a set of goals.





Source: Olivier Serrat. 2009. Glossary of Knowledge Management. Knowledge Solutions. Manila: ADB /Peter, Senge. "The Fifth Discipline." The Art & Practice of Learning Organisation. Cornerstone Digital; new edition (2010).

5. This technical report is organised as follows:

¹ The evaluation approach paper is available at <https://www.ebrd.com/ap-scf-2021-23.pdf>

² IEvD. 2021. *Learning and Knowledge Management at the EBRD*. Available: at <https://www.ebrd.com/sites/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395296164832&pagename=EBRD%2FContent%2FDownloadDocument>.

- Section 2 provides context and background information.
- Section 3 assesses the progress achieved against strategic goals in the sphere of LKM and results management, as well as key results. It includes the assessment against recommendations provided by IEvD's LKM Evaluation in 2021. Assessment is done using a four-category traffic light system, as follows:

 Complete <i>Indicates that the aspect is performing well and is on track to meet or exceed the targets.</i>	 Some progress <i>Highlights that the aspect is underperforming and requires significant improvements to meet the targets.</i>
 Significant progress <i>Signals that the aspect is progressing, but there are some concerns that may need attention to ensure targets are met.</i>	 Limited progress <i>Denotes that the aspect is critically underperforming and urgent action is needed to address the issues and meet the targets.</i>

- Section 4 presents insights and suggestions for future improvements.

2. Background and context

2.1. The ambition of SCF 2021-25 on results, knowledge management and learning culture

6. While not identified as a core area for strengthening EBRD's business model and toolkit, there is ambition in the SCF regarding LKM and evaluation. One of the strategy's stated results is that the Bank will have "*strengthened its overall results framework, knowledge management and the use of evaluation findings to improve the design and impact of operations*" by 2025 (SCF, page 19, Box 1).

7. The strategy commits to establish the systems and culture to capture and analyse data, therefore communicating the Bank's impact and to support continuous learning (SCF, page 6). It also commits to consolidate knowledge, experience gained and lesson learning, especially in the core areas of the EBRD's distinct expertise (SCF, page 46). Plus, the SCF identifies the need for improved self-evaluation, a better process to feedback knowledge and stronger systems to manage know-how and to make it available quickly and easily (SCF, page 46).³

8. The 2023 paid-in capital increase approved by the Board of Governors to help the EBRD deal with the extraordinary circumstances created by the war on Ukraine came with several policy and institutional evolution commitments. While none of these were of immediate and direct significance to LKM, a few have implications for knowledge capture, lesson identification and the promotion of learning (see Annex 1).

2.2. Cascading of SCF's LKM priorities into SIPs, sector and country strategies

9. The cascading of the ambition of LKM over the three SIPs to date focused on; (i) establishing a self-evaluation system aimed mainly at learning; (ii) supporting the Bank's digital transformation agenda as the basis for future LKM developments (i.e., laying the foundation in the words of the SIP); (iii) and various developments in human resources (HR). The evaluation team looked at cascading as a way of translating SCF priorities into the narrative, priorities, suggested activities and potential results of the lower-level strategies.

10. Incremental resources were budgeted for the new self-evaluation system, evaluation by management, but centralised LKM function in general continued to rely almost totally on donor funds. Strengthening self-evaluation and results management was one of three priority areas for incremental spending in SIP 2021-23, though most additional funding went to self-evaluation (see Annex 1).

³ Detailed analysis of LKM coverage in SCF document is presented in Annex 2, along with the cascading into SIPs, sector and country strategies.

11. Establishing the EBRD as a learning organisation and improving knowledge transfer across the Bank were identified as important areas of focus for people (staff) development, with mention of a skills audit and mobility schemes.

12. **SIP 2022-24 indicates that the EBRD has ambitions to be an innovative bank.** In reference to its work on the Green Economy Transition (GET), the Bank notes that innovation requires adequate staffing, trial and error, risk appetite and the removal of internal barriers to “thinking outside the box”. IEvD strongly agrees with this significant statement.

13. **It also focuses heavily on improved self-evaluation** with details of the proposed reforms that would provide a greater focus on learning. The SIP 2022-24 document stresses the link between enhanced policy engagement and improved knowledge capture and dissemination. It also continues the theme of people development in terms of creating a learning bank including through KM. The incremental resource allocations for a new self-evaluation system are confirmed.

14. The SIP 2023-25 essentially says that further significant gains in LKM will come from EBRD’s digital transformation agenda in the strategic period. No incremental resources are proposed for LKM or evaluation in this SIP.

15. **The analysis showed little coverage of the LKM priority in either country or sector/corporate strategies.** IEvD assessed the 16 country strategies approved during the evaluation period for coverage of LKM. It also reviewed six sector and other strategies approved during the evaluation period.⁴

16. Ten of the 16 country strategies made no mention of LKM while the three strategies for the Baltic countries all mentioned knowledge transfer across the countries as an objective. Where mentioned, statements were generic with no detail of how knowledge was to be created or transferred. Among the sector/corporate strategies, those for the ‘soft’ areas of Equality of Opportunity Strategy 2021-2024 and the Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality 2021-2025 gave somewhat more coverage to knowledge matters with some specifics as to what was to be done.

17. **There should be no expectation that country and sector strategies reflect SCF priorities around LKM, which in the first instance is about developing EBRD’s internal capacity to be a knowledge and learning bank.** However, it would not be unrealistic for country strategies to include a plan to capture knowledge from experience at the country level and to consider how to deliver the knowledge products and services as one of the tools in EBRD’s toolkit. Country strategies could identify knowledge gaps that, if filled, could improve the Bank’s impact at the country and/or sector level. However, they do not currently do this beyond formal identification of lessons from previous strategic period.

18. The Bank is delivering a range of knowledge products and services through its policy dialogue and associated technical cooperation (TC); its annual transition report and assessment of TQs,

⁴ [Accelerating the Digital Transition 2021-2025](#), [Energy Sector Strategy 2024-2028](#), [Equality of Opportunity Strategy 2021-2025](#), [Financial Sector Strategy 2021-2025](#), [Mining Sector Strategy 2024](#), [Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality 2021-2025](#).

economic reports, business surveys, self-evaluations and diagnostic reports, along with a range of *ad hoc* reports and studies.

19. However, there is no overview of this work at the country strategy level and therefore no coordinated or strategic approach to its delivery. Nor is there any idea of how this work can aid the generation of TI. The recent Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) report (see Annex 3) makes a similar point in areas for improvement ("*Identify an institutional approach for delivering client-facing knowledge to drive transition impact*"). There is the Results Snapshot issued for each country on a regular basis. However, IEvD indicated that this is more of a public relations promotional product rather than a meaningful reflection on the impact achieved on the ground through EBRD's activities, including learning from failure.

20. EBRD country strategies include a standard sub-section on implementing the prior strategy – Key Lessons and the Way Forward. While hopefully contributing to the formulation of the current strategy, this learning is unlikely to be integrated into any KM system.

3. Key findings: Building a true learning culture across the EBRD is a work in progress

3.1. Slow progress on building a learning culture and strengthening knowledge management

3.1.1. In 2021-23, the EBRD's ambition on LKM declined vis-à-vis the original goal outlined in the SCF

21. **Evidence shows that LKM is not part of the Bank's DNA yet.** As discussed in Chapter 2, resources allocated to LKM actions over 2021-2023 so far do not match the ambition held in SCF 2021-2025.⁵ Management has shifted its LKM focus to ensure LKM needs are incorporated into EBRD's digital transformation agenda comprising Data Strategy and the enhancement of information technology (IT) systems (all separately funded aside from specific LKM considerations).

22. **Evidence shows that the initial aspiration underlining the SCF to develop a strong learning culture in the institution has declined over time.** The most serious omission is that a value proposition for LKM has not been developed to build institutional commitment. There was no advocacy work by the LKM unit to create a champion at the ExCom level, for example.

23. **Data strategy and IT enhancements are important 'building blocks' to create an effective and efficient LKM. But while technological developments play a crucial role, they cannot be the only driver of the EBRD's evolution into a knowledge bank and/or learning and innovative organisation.** Also, these building blocks focus on consistent taxonomy and the accessibility of existing explicit knowledge. As important as these aspects are, the capture of tacit knowledge and the bringing in of outside knowledge are not (yet) covered.

24. A focal point for LKM has been created within the VP3, though it is small and relies mostly on donor resources. Its remit is also mostly limited to the Client Services Group (Banking VP and VP3), rather than the entire Bank. Becoming a knowledge bank and a learning organisation will require a significant and potentially challenging cultural shift. It will also call for investment in products, processes and incentives to turn data into information and then into knowledge that can be curated and applied.

⁵ The SCF itself notes "the Bank will need the means to deliver on its ambition. This requires strategic choices" (para. 150) and further on "it is critical to signal that it will not be possible to deliver on the ambition contained in the proposed strategy for 2021-2025 without the necessary resources" (para. 153).

3.1.2 Limited progress has been made on implementing evaluation recommendations aimed at fostering a learning culture in the Bank

25. In relation to the recommendations made by IEvD to foster a learning culture and enhance KM, Management initially fully agreed with all four evaluation recommendations. Management also noted concerns about resources, competing priorities and time for cultural change.

26. However, it moderated its ambitions in additional comments and MAP, which was delayed by approximately one year due to the restructuring of VP3. This restructuring incorporated the Kirk Report (2019) recommendations and LKM evaluation recommendations, including the creation of a LKM unit.

27. **IEvD's recommendations were intended as sequential steps.** Since the first recommendation has not been acted upon, progress on the other three is limited (see Table 1). No value proposition or framework for LKM has been developed since 2021. No additional staff or budget have been allocated (unlike for the new self-evaluation system) and no metrics or monitoring systems have been established to enhance value creation around LKM.

28. **In addition, LKM generally continued to rely almost totally on donor funds.** Establishing the EBRD as a learning organisation and improving knowledge transfer across the Bank were identified as important areas of focus for people (staff) development, with mention of a skills audit and mobility schemes.

29. **For instance, SIP 2022-24 focuses on improved self-evaluation with details of the proposed reforms that would provide a greater focus on learning.** The SIP also stresses the link between enhanced policy engagement and improved knowledge capture and dissemination. No incremental resources are proposed for LKM in this SIP.

Table 1: Delivering SCF ambition on LKM and results management

Recommendation in the 2021 LKM evaluation	IEvD assessment of the progress achieved (as of mid-2024)
<p>● = largely complete; ● = significant progress; ● = some progress; ● = limited progress</p>	
1. Define the value proposition for LKM relative to the EBRD's strategic objectives and transition mandate.	<p>● = limited progress</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management's initial response and full agreement was heavily caveated subject to resource availability and competing priorities. By the time of its additional comments and issuance of its MAP, Management had substantially backtracked on its earlier agreement. Instead, it proposed that its actions would focus on the basic level of data management, which would substitute for the direct investments in LKM intended by the recommendation. The alternatives were 'supporting' the already funded digital transformation agenda, including IT system improvements and the comprehensive Data Strategy. Without the established value of LKM as a source of value creation and differentiation rather than a cost, the Bank will be unlikely to achieve its ambition of being a knowledge bank and learning organisation, let alone an innovative organisation. In short, a culture change is required. Strengthening VP3 to "showcase the value of KM products and services" would achieve the intent of IEvD's recommendation had VP3 been resourced to fulfil this task. In IEvD's view, this reality is substantially a consequence of there being no high-level leadership for LKM in the Bank's ExCom.

Recommendation in the 2021 LKM evaluation	IEvD assessment of the progress achieved (as of mid-2024)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unlike in process management, where EBRD follows American Productivity and Quality Centre's (APQC) standards and certification, it is not doing so for APQC certification in KM. IEvD remains convinced that APQC's KM assessment tools would be of high value to the Bank. IEvD noted with interest the work of Human Resources and Organisational Development (HROD) in running similar awareness, creating and learning opportunities on digitalisation through exposure visits and bringing speakers in. • Similarly, the EBRD should actively seek to share the experience of other multilateral development banks (MDBs) by bringing in LKM champions and specialists from other MDBs, such as a recent talk by Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Chief Knowledge Manager, among others.
<p>2. Prepare, approve and implement a LKM framework/enhanced approach to deliver the defined value proposition through core function. It should include all essential elements as presented in this evaluation.</p>	<p>● = limited progress ● = some progress</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This bivalent assessment recognises that in the first instance, the actions taken do not address the intent of recommendation 2 – that there would be investment directly in LKM to deliver the value proposition agreed by implementing recommendation 1. • On the other hand, the activities of the LKM Unit in VP3 have been valuable in helping ensure that KM considerations are part of the transformation agenda and its component parts in the sphere of the Data Strategy and IT infrastructure. It is also initiating work on an Impact Portal. A new self-evaluation system has been developed and implementation is now underway. It is important that this demonstrates how it will achieve its ambition of fostering learning. • The HROD department has several workstreams to facilitate LKM (dealt with separately below). • These disparate activities need to be part of a coherent medium roadmap (stated as a framework/enhanced approach in the recommendation).
<p>3. Commit adequate core human and financial resources matching the ambition of the approved LKM framework/enhanced approach.</p>	<p>● = limited progress</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This assessment is made as the intent of the recommendation is yet to be realised. The EBRD commits little in the way of core human and financial resources to LKM. • IEvD acknowledges that most if not all parts of the Bank are operating under severe resource constraints, so it offers no judgment on whether this lack of resources for LKM is positive or negative. However, it is a reality. • Currently, there is a mismatch between ambition stated in the SCF and resources available for LKM. This could be addressed to some extent in the remaining period of the SCF or during the subsequent SCF. Either ambitions are scaled back or resources are increased. If ambitions are scaled up, significant additional resources will be required.
<p>4. Establish a system comprising a Theory of Change (TOC), case studies and performance metrics for measuring and reporting on the achieved value-added of LKM; conduct regular reviews of the process and results of the EBRD's LKM to feed into budgeting and the SIP strategic process; and evaluate results achieved at the end of SCF 2021-2025 period.</p>	<p>● = limited progress</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews carried out as part of this evaluation indicated that there is a 'Catch 22' situation with limited resources for LKM. This means that progress on developing LKM products to demonstrate value-added is slow, so these are not yet available to demonstrate the value-added of further investment. • Work is ongoing for developing an Impact Portal (incorporating the Policy Academy), an integrated Lessons Database to incorporate and replace IEvD's Lessons Investigation Application, and the creation of a Policy Database. Work is also ongoing to develop TOCs and the Impact Department launched a series of Impact Horizon papers.

3.1.3 The HROD has made significant advances in LKM

30. Over the years, the HROD undertook several initiatives aimed at advancing LKM, often within existing resource availability and whilst working with other parts of the Bank to combine efforts.

Much of the work is aimed at contributing to the cultural shift the Bank must undertake in order to become a knowledge, learning and innovative entity.

31. Organisation design principles approved by ExCom in 2020 charted the way for underlying structural changes that aimed to create less fragmentation across the organisation, including in the areas of LKM, results and policy engagement. It is gradually being implemented, amidst some delay due to the Covid-19 pandemic and other crises. The HROD recognises that putting in place the tools is one thing and getting them fully utilised is another; narrowing this divergence is key.

32. The EBRD launched new Workplace Behaviours in 2024, which should enable the Bank to better deliver its mandate in a rapidly changing environment. Processes included intensive consultation process with hundreds of staff in the Bank's headquarters (HQ) and resident offices (RO) providing their feedback on the most essential behaviours. These will now be incorporated into both the individual performance system and corporate processes and protocols.

Box 2: EBRD's workplace behaviours and their role in incentivising learning

The EBRD's four behaviours include; i) Listen well and speak up; ii) Collaborate smartly; iii) Simplify to amplify; and iv) Act decisively, commit fully.

These four behaviours imply a robust framework for institutional learning at the EBRD. By promoting active listening and encouraging open dialogue, the organisation fosters an environment where diverse perspectives are valued.

Collaboration, when done smartly, ensures that knowledge is shared efficiently across departments and breaks down silos.

Simplifying processes can help in amplifying the impact of lessons learned, making them more accessible and actionable.

Finally, decisive actions and a full commitment to decisions ensures that learning is not just theoretical but translates into practical improvements and innovations, driving the organisation towards its strategic goals.

These four behaviours also imply that we can learn from outcomes that differ from our expectations, but these lessons should be shared constructively and without blame. We must act confidently, with conviction and learn the right lessons for the future.

33. The HROD's talent management team had very informative stories to tell. These provide positive examples of learning and knowledge sharing and a model that the LKM team could adopt to promote LKM. For example, multi-pronged efforts to support the SCF priorities of green and digital were very successful.

34. Changing the culture to encourage challenging prevailing viewpoints, as well as recognising and learning from failures ("failing forward"), will be important for LKM to establish itself in the

EBRD. In addition to aforementioned workplace behaviours, that includes “speaking up”. The HROD has partnered with others on a Speaking Up Project that addresses inappropriate behaviour, whistleblowing, countering group think and introducing new ideas and perspectives.

35. An EBRD Learning System, known as ELSy, was launched in 2023. This has democratised learning as no approvals from superiors are needed for staff to engage in training; anyone can do anything at any time.

3.1.4. Issues were raised by the Internal Audit Department (IAD) in 2024 on the impact of the risk surrounding lesson learning not being addressed

36. In its recent report on Bank-wide Risk Management,⁶ IAD noted that: *“The Bank’s processes to record, disseminate and learn lessons from banking projects and other relevant initiatives – as identified under the principles of the Evaluation Policy and Project Accountability Mechanism – are not yet fully established or embedded.”* In particular, the report noted *“differences in maturity between the Bank’s processes around learning lessons identified under the principles of the Evaluation Policy and Project Accountability Mechanism.”*

37. The impact of the risk surrounding lesson learning not being addressed is stated as: *“Increased costs, missed opportunities and loss of stakeholder trust leads to the diminished accountability for learning.”* The causes of the problem are: *“The tools available may hinder an efficient dissemination of lessons learnt and the usefulness of the process may not be consistently recognised at all levels of the organisation.”*

38. Actions in response to this audit involve Management, the Independent Project Accountability Mechanism (IPAM) and IEvD. While this evaluation agrees that the actions proposed are necessary, more is certainly needed to ensure that lessons are routinely considered. IEvD intends to utilise significant recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) to facilitate easy access to evaluation outcomes, insights and recommendations.

39. There is another unaddressed risk– namely, the need for staff to demonstrate the right behaviours. The IAD report identifies the problem: *“Staff prioritise delivery of core business objectives without formally considering adherence to the Bank’s behavioural competencies.”* While this finding is not focused on LKM, it is clearly relevant. A culture change will be required for the EBRD to become a knowledge, learning and innovative organisation.

40. Another finding in the IAD report of relevance to LKM is that: *“Policies, Directives, Procedures and Guidance within the Bank are not consistently sent for filing in the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) Repository for Policies, Directives, Procedures and Guidance (“Repository”) nor reviewed according to their published review dates.”* This is very much to do with KM. Again, this highlights the challenges facing the Bank in ‘knowing what it knows’ – capturing knowledge, continually refreshing its knowledge resources and making them available.

⁶ Internal Audit Report IAR 24/04 - 15 04 2024 (<https://pegasus.ebrd.com/viewdocument/58459>)

3.1.5. Progress in LKM has been slowed down due to the recent multiple crises and changing environment.

41. Progress in LKM has been slowed down due to the recent multiple crises and a changing global landscape, creating a very challenging environment for the EBRD over the evaluation period (2021-23). These challenges include the Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath, the ongoing war on Ukraine, plus other violent conflicts and natural disasters across many regions of operation. The Bank has approved its latest general capital increase in December 2023 to resource its response to the war on Ukraine, among other priorities. The Bank also continues the process of limited and incremental expansion into sub-Saharan Africa and Iraq, as approved by the Board of Governors in May 2023. In the face of events unforeseen and foreseen, priorities understandably and inevitably had to change.

42. But there are other factors that affect the progress of LKM. There remains a lack of a champion for LKM at the ExCom level, which is an essential attribute for championing the organisational and cultural transformations required. Consequently, there are limited resources given to LKM (aside from those provided to the digital transformation agenda and some sectoral agendas).

43. The shift to focus on LKM elements of the funded digital transformation agenda made sense in this context. The EBRD has embarked on a major programme to revamp its entire digital platform and initiated a significant institutional transformation programme, including moving its HQ.

44. With preparation of the next SCF underway, it is timely for the Bank to reassess its ambitions to evolve into a knowledge bank, a learning organisation and an innovative entity. Even more importantly, it is timely to assess what resources are needed to achieve the Bank's ambitions, thus addressing the misalignment in the current SCF period. The EBRD has confronted and dealt admirably with multiple and unforeseen events in the short-term, but consideration is needed as to whether the Bank that exists today is the Bank that will be needed in the future.

45. Finally, this evaluation acknowledges that issues related to building a solid LKM are shared widely among MDBs and beyond. Many causes for this reality have been identified, including, *inter alia*, a lack of senior leadership committed to LKM as a priority, pressure to avoid risks and admission of failure. This means there is limited learning from mistakes and a lack of incentive/s to propel LKM.

3.2. Good progress in Results Management, but effects pending⁷

3.2.1. As recognised in the SCF, Results Management is a key dimension of the learning culture of an institution and the EBRD was first among IFIs to focus on impact since its inception.

46. TI is a cornerstone in the Bank's existence, operations and intellectual environment. Over three decades, the EBRD has undertaken several incremental updates of the transition concept and methodology to measure project impact to respond to new challenges, countries of operation (CoO), and innovations.

47. The recent institutional reorganisation is expected to be more conducive to enhancements in measuring and reporting TI. The organisational restructuring, including the creation of a dedicated Impact Department, clarified roles and responsibilities related to impact measurement. The Impact Department is a hub responsible for upholding the Bank's TI mandate and ensuring that it is communicated in a compelling and credible way.

3.2.2. The EBRD is working to improve its ability to understand, report and communicate its TI

48. The reform of the Transition Objectives Measurement System (TOMS) 2.0. takes stock of several suggestions made by IEvD over the years and summarised in the recent Evaluation Synthesis of the EBRD's approach to TI. The key insights emerging from that evaluation work includes the following:

49. The definition of the TQs is abstract, making it very challenging to translate them into a coherent programme. Essentially, their operationalisation remains unclear. The work on the TOC of the TQs has been delayed due the internal reorganisation and the ongoing revision of the Expected Transition Impact (ETI) methodology. The papers articulating the operationalisation of the TQs⁸ are a good starting point, but with some limits that require important work to be overcome.

50. For instance, the causal pathways narrowing the TQ gaps are described, but not clearly articulated. This makes them difficult to measure and evaluate. Evidence from former evaluations points to the need for clear impact pathways that include casual links, hypotheses and assumptions. These must describe not only *what* TI has been achieved, but also *how* and *why* the transition works. A high-level thematic or sectoral narrative or results chain outlining the broader causal chains of TI would help elucidate the process and tell the story. There is ongoing work and significant progress on the TOC of the Inclusive quality, but an extension of this revamped approach is long overdue.

51. The EBRD is the only MDB that does not publish a development effectiveness/TI report clearly articulating the results of its activities against ex-ante estimates, building, among others,

⁷ This chapter includes evidence from the recently published Evaluation Synthesis of the EBRD's approach to Transition Impact (2017-2023), SS23-197

⁸ i.e. SGS17-114, SGS18-238, SGS17-079, CS/FO/17-01, CS/FO/17-02 and BDS14-217

on a robust project-level self-evaluation system. Management has recently agreed to the creation of a new impact (and sustainability) report, with the first planned for publication in 2025.

52. The broader TI generated by the Bank's interventions is not captured by the existing transition results architecture. The main limitation of the current EBRD's results architecture is a lack of ability to capture systemic change, though this is at the very core of the Bank's mandate. Systemic change is different from project-level outcomes/impact and indirect/induced effects. It refers to fundamental changes to structures, behaviours, or relationships by market participants. Driving systemic change often involves changing the underlying roles, norms, structures and incentives within a market system, rather than focusing on the outputs from an individual project.

53. In addition, the existing architecture does not fully capture projects' indirect and induced effects. There is no relationship – either quantitative or qualitative – between transition gaps and results measurement; therein lies the “missing middle”. Project level impact refers to the project outcomes and effects on stakeholders, the economy, as well as, potentially, the environment and society. This a lack of measurement of indirect and demonstration effects undermines the Bank's ability to manage for development results, including by measuring wider impacts and linking its contribution to country progress. The transition results architecture can only capture direct effects at project level, which are typically physical outputs and directly measurable operation outcomes.

54. Finally, the ETI methodology, and the TQs framework more broadly, are not adequate to capture TI in contexts of crisis. The multi-crises context exacerbates the unresolved tension between strengthening resilience pre-crisis and preventing reversals post-crisis. The TQs do not capture the elements of shocks as currently defined: the Resilience TQ is relevant primarily to operations in a non-crisis context.

55. The TI indicators (benchmarks) in the Compendium of Indicators focus on improving client resilience in the event of an exogenous shock (financial and energy-related), which supposes that the client is not sufficiently resilient to withstand a shock that has not occurred. Evaluations highlighted that if crisis response assistance is to prevent transition reversals, the current toolbox does not offer suitable indicators under the Resilient TQ or the other TQs.

3.2.3 The large majority (c.a. 70-75%) of bank's projects benefit from a streamlined assessment of Transition Impact, raising questions around the trade-off between efficiency and rigour

56. The issues highlighted by recent evaluation work regarding the ETI methodology in times of crisis should be seen in the broader context of the difficulty of measuring TI of projects with streamlined assessments under frameworks. For example, the evidence from the EvD EBRD Green Cities Programme Interim Evaluation (2016-21) shows that, for widely successful programmes, the Bank has thus far missed the opportunity to monitor TI in a way that aligns with programme size and importance.

57. More generally and based on a preliminary internal analysis, the project share that receives a standalone assessment is around one-third, while the share that benefits from a streamlined assessment is around two-thirds. This includes sub-operations under frameworks excluding those

that still mandate a standalone assessment, such as the Direct Finance Framework (DFF)-non Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Other institutions (i.e. IFC) require much more scrutiny at a project-by-project level, raising the question whether the EBRD hasn't gone too far in terms of efficiency.

58. The second issue relates to measure TI at a framework-level and discrepancy of scrutiny between stand-alone and projects under framework, both ex-ante and ex-post. Evaluation work highlighted that how the ETI is derived for them, how TQs are assigned and the extent to which frameworks are leveraged to deliver specific branches of the TOC of the six TQs remain unclear.

78. **There is a serious risk of providing a partial picture of performance given that understanding TI of frameworks requires a different approach to collecting and analysing data. This affects EBRD's self-evaluation system and its results architecture as a whole.**

3.3. Progress in re-building the self-evaluation system has been slow and remains incomplete

3.3.1. The EBRD's new self-evaluation system is being rolled out after iterations of design and piloting.

59. **The Bank started working on establishing the building blocks for a self-evaluation system four years ago.** The 2019 Kirk Report⁹ was highly critical of self-evaluation in the EBRD and Management set about addressing the deficiencies identified. A phased approach to self-evaluation was proposed in 2021, largely due to the constrained resources (see Annex 2).

60. **Evaluation by Management is recognised as one of the pillars of the EBRD's evaluation function in the recently revised Evaluation Policy.** Over the last several years, with incremental resources made available in SIP 2022-2024, Management developed a new format for project-level self-evaluation. This resulted in the creation of the Summary Project Assessment (SPA). Its purpose is *"to deliver useful and useable output in a manner that is integrated with other elements of impact assessment and evaluation; particular emphasis is placed on harvesting rich, interesting and relevant lessons learned that would feed back through the knowledge management processes."*¹⁰ Management consulted IEvD regularly in the process and IEvD provided comments to several iterations of SPAs with the objective of ensuring it is aligned with the best practices and standards in evaluation.

61. **Following a pilot in 2023, SPAs were rolled out in 2024. These were initially Excel-based and covered just over eighty operations.** The SPA module is currently being integrated into the EBRD Monarch platform with the aim of delivering 120-150 SPAs per year.

62. The SPA is the current 'cornerstone' product of the new self-evaluation system. It informs other elements illustrated in Figure 1. These include "deep dives" that are managed by another

⁹ 2019 Report on the EBRD's Evaluation System (Kirk Report)

¹⁰ Internal document: Self-evaluation update, January 2024

component of the self-evaluation system focused on delivering demand-driven thematic assessments, such as examining clusters of SPAs to distil lessons applicable beyond a single project.

63.

Figure 1: Follow-on processes and products using the SPA



Source: Internal document: Self-evaluation update, January 2024

3.3.2 Key questions remain with respect to the new self-evaluation system fulfilling both its accountability and learning functions.

64. **Whether project self-evaluation (SPA) will contribute significantly to institutional learning depends on its full integration into the Bank's technology platforms.** This integration includes workflow and connection with other monitoring systems, as well as the integration of lessons from SPA into common knowledge platforms with capacity to ensure that relevant lessons are automatically drawn to the attention of staff preparing new projects, most likely through the use of cognitive automation (the commonly used term is AI).

65. **Other conditions include the representativeness of self-evaluation and monitoring data quality.** Despite the expected higher volume of SPAs in coming years, whether the sampling of operations subject to self-evaluation allows for meaningful conclusions on the overall performance of the Bank's portfolio remains to be clarified. A particular issue with the representativeness of self-evaluation is the fact that SPAs are conducted on individual operations and no tool exists for systematically assessing framework-level performance and results. Another constraint is data quality, which needs to be ensured throughout the project cycle – especially considering the automated integration into the SPA.


66. The extent of learning also depends on the quality and utility of subsequent analysis of clusters of SPA and other deep dives. Broader lessons from thematic assessments looking at groups of operations are also an important source of learning besides project-level lessons, and their integration into the common knowledge platforms is also an important pre-requisite.

67. Importantly, the expert curation of these KM tools and systems will be essential for their sustainability. Whether a lesson generated in one context is relevant to another requires judgment, either by a human or AI, so it is critical that lessons be accompanied by their context. Also, curation needs to link recurring lessons as multiple occurrences as a single occurrence lesson can be termed a 'lesson hypothesis' whereas multiple occurrences provided added confidence that there is a generalisable lesson.

68. Management has an ambitious plan for the collection, collation, quality control and use of lessons (Figure 2). This work will also focus on incentives, award mechanism and feedback on usefulness of lessons. It is a part of three KM tools to be developed, together with the Impact Portal and the Policy Database. All three products are expected to feed into each other. The expected benefit will be improved EBRD performance and results delivery through better project design and active learning from past experiences.

69. These plans are in constant evolution to make the most of available AI technology to facilitate both the curation and gathering of lessons and the dissemination through the use of tools such as the LessonsBot, which is currently being piloted.

Figure 2: Elements of the proposed lessons system



Source: Internal document: Self-evaluation update, January 2024

70. The task ahead is ambitious and since much of it is in the future, it is unclear as to how much will be resourced. Reference to the SIP 2024-2026 shows the VP3 budget increasing by £200,000 (£32.4 million in 2024 versus £32.1 million in 2023), so it is unlikely there will be significant incremental funding available for these developments.

3.4. Using evaluation to inform decision-making is improving, but not yet systematic

3.4.1. Learning from evaluation, both independent and evaluation by Management, is hampered by critical Bank-wide constraints

71. IEvD responded to all recommendation made in the Kirk Report (2019). It prepared and implemented its first Strategic Plan 2022-25, underpinned by a ToC. It also prepared and is gradually improving its Results Framework, supporting the tracking and the performance of its various workstreams.

72. It enhanced its technical capacity, including through the creation of a small Evaluation Knowledge Management (EKM) team, leading to greater internal and external outreach and communications. Plus, its product mix expanded to include real-time evaluations, synthetic and learning products and report formats have significantly improved. Combined with more visual representation of evaluation findings, this overall contributes to greater accessibility of evaluative evidence and knowledge.

73. Despite these efforts, evidence shows that learning from evaluation, both independent and evaluation by Management, is constrained by a corporate culture that does not incentivise learning. This includes a reluctance to acknowledge failure and to learn from it, and limited evaluability of the Bank's activities.

74. In addition, the EBRD project's design phase does not systematically consider relevant evaluation findings. The lack of integration of lessons learned in the operational cycle (part of the Monarch platform) has been also identified by IAD as serious risk for the organisation (see Chapter 3.1.4).

75. Engagement between IEvD and Management could add significant value if entered into voluntarily. Constructive engagement can foster positive change and facilitate knowledge transfer. It helps deliver positive change, transfers tacit knowledge and understanding in both directions, provides for improved EvD public relations and creates a network of contacts for future collaboration.

3.4.2. The incorporation of lessons emerging from independent evaluation into Bank's activities has proven to be an influential channel by which evaluations become used

76. Evidence shows that the adoption of independent evaluation recommendations or suggestions is potentially influential channel for IEvD's work to be useful and used. The incorporation lessons and use of findings from evaluation is strongest for new strategies where a preceding evaluation has taken place.

77. After the formal requirement to reflect project lessons in Board project approval documents was dropped, lessons from prior experience largely do not feature in project documents. The formal process of assisting the banking teams with lessons to include and formal IEvD sign-off of

lessons were dropped. When however, evaluations are delivered timely ahead of new strategic cycles (for example country or sector), there is evidence that lessons and findings inform the new strategies.

78. Looking forward, IEvD intends to utilise significant recent progress in AI to facilitate easy access to evaluation outcomes, insights, and recommendations. The “LessonsBot” is being developed, in partnership with the IT Department and other Bank departments, as a mean to enhance the learning up taking from evaluation evidence by Management and Board directors. It represents a significant stride towards enhancing institutional learning.

79. This “intelligent” chatbot will provide easy access to evaluation outcomes, insights, and recommendations, ensuring that lessons are readily available and continuously updated with new reports. By facilitating quick and systematic incorporation of these lessons into new project designs, the LessonsBot aims to embed a culture of learning and adaptability within the EBRD, thereby improving the overall effectiveness and impact of its operations.

80. The use of AI is also expected to drive efficiency gains. In 2024, IEvD has focused on using AI for its “downstream” activities, such as using chatbot for disseminating evaluative knowledge to the Board and EBRD staff.

3.4.3 Currently, the follow-up of evaluation recommendations does not fully focus on problem resolution or learning.

81. The practices followed for making recommendations and their follow-up are another area that may need to be reconsidered as part of realising evaluation’s potential to contribute to organisational learning. Points that can be noted are:

82. Recommendations point to issues that are often complex and the answer to them is not clear, therefore a problem-driven iterative adaptation approach is needed. Currently tracking actions taken on recommendations is largely about accountability (of management for taking proposed actions to address evaluation recommendations). While this may be important to ensure progress and report to the Board, it may not be sufficient to advance learning from problem resolution.

83. Consequently, the focus of follow-up on recommendations should be on monitoring what’s happening to the problem. The follow-up process can complement reporting on actions taken by re-examining them considering the initial problem. Doing so can generate information to decide whether the problem has been resolved and how (with lessons identified), or if it remains, what further actions are needed. The World Bank is moving in this direction with what it calls “an outcomes approach”.

3.4.4 Access to data and information needs improvement to enable meaningful analysis and learning

84. The data, information and knowledge about EBRD activities and results are not always easily available or accessible to the Bank’s staff, including IEvD. Certainly, there is no ‘one-stop shop’ to access what is needed. To EBRD’s credit it has recognised the problem and is working on it.

However, the reality of IEvD's lived experience shows the need for more investment in LKM (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Example from a 2024 independent evaluation

1.3. Access to information and other limitations to the evaluation

Information on the monitoring and reporting of [REDACTED] activities was often not easily accessible or not available to the team undertaking this evaluation, creating several weeks of delays and making it harder to assess actual results and draw all the relevant lessons. For example, important challenges related to the availability and quality of information led to a substantial delay in the completion of the Approach Paper. Those challenges were exacerbated during the core evaluation phase.

Box 3: Challenges experienced

- Monitoring reports, [REDACTED] action plans, [REDACTED] baselines and TC data were not easily accessible to the team. IEvD experienced frequent delays in response from the [REDACTED] staff who needed considerable time to retrieve relevant data.
- Staffing issues were a barrier when accessing information, including a lack of staff handovers amidst departures and changes in the [REDACTED] team. Furthermore, staff frequently relied on referrals to other colleagues to access information. Departure of staff members exacerbated the issue, resulting in further delays in the retrieval of information.
- [REDACTED] information recorded in EBRD's IT systems, including Technical Cooperation Reporting System (TCRS) and Project link, was often outdated and lacked basic information about activities.
- The evaluation team experienced important challenges in extracting TC-related data through the Technical Cooperation Reporting system. Checking and triangulating them with other data sources required considerable effort and time.
- Reporting, monitoring and filing of gender information did not appear to be systematic and there was no clear allocation of responsibility with respect to data collection and management.

Note: Since the problem illustrated is generic rather than specific to one area or team, details have been redacted / Source: Recent IEvD evaluation.

4. Insights and suggestions

4.1. Key insights

85. First of all, the evaluation noted that the Bank has made some progress towards its strategic ambition to strengthen the results framework and LKM ambitions, although it is limited. The most serious omission is the lack of a developed value proposition for LKM.

86. Resources allocated to LKM actions over 2021-23 do not match the level of ambition in the SCF. An institutional focal point for LKM has been created within VP3, though it is small, with focus on the Client Services Group, and relies mostly on donor resources.

87. Progress has also been limited due to shifting priorities and resource constraints. Influential factors for the slow progress include an understandable strategic shift in priorities due to multiple crises, a lack of a champion for LKM at the ExCom level, and limited resources allocated to LKM, with some exceptions.

88. HROD has undertaken several initiatives to advance LKM, including organisational changes and talent development, though not all staff are fully utilising these tools.

89. In addition, EBRD has made strides in TI measurement, but challenges remain in operationalising the TQs and capturing broader systemic changes, although those are expected to be addressed by the upcoming reform of TOMS 2.0.

90. A new project self-evaluation system, ‘owned’ and run by Management is being rolled out in 2024 after several years of preparatory work. Whether it will deliver on its intention to contribute significantly to learning is yet to be revealed.

91. Finally, the use of evaluation (both “independent” and “self-evaluation”/“evaluation by Management”) to inform decision-making remains limited due to organisation-wide constraints with serious potential risks for the EBRD. The incorporation of lessons is potentially the most influential channel by which evaluations become used. Secondly, the adoption and acting on independent evaluation recommendations or suggestions is another influential channel for IEvD’s work to be useful and used.

4.2. Suggestions for further improvement

Suggestion 1: Clarify the Bank's ambition in LKM and create incentive mechanisms for promoting a true learning culture

92. As the preparation of new SCF for 2026-2030 is underway, it is timely to reassess ambitions on being a knowledge bank, a learning organisation and an innovative entity.

Issue – why it needs to be changed	Suggestion – what needs to be changed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is a lack of clarity and understanding about the LKM vision, objectives and resource implications. Issues related to building a solid LKM, shared widely among MDBs, include lack of senior leadership committed to LKM as a priority, pressure to avoid risks and admission of failure meaning that there is limited learning from mistakes, particularly as identified by evaluation, and a lack of incentives in support of LKM. 	<p>To enhance its strategic relevance and performance, the EBRD should determine its future LKM ambition by clarifying objectives, implementation plan, incentive mechanism and resources needed.</p>

Suggestion 2: Build robust results management and self-evaluation system as a foundation for institutional learning and innovation

93. As the recent MOPAN Assessment highlights,¹¹ opportunity remains for EBRD to strengthen self-evaluation to provide a clearer picture of performance across the institution, balancing accountability and learning.

Issue – why it needs to be changed	Suggestion – what needs to be changed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The self-evaluation system is still evolving and it is unclear whether it can fully support accountability and learning in the Bank. Lessons from both independent evaluation and evaluation by Management (including self-evaluation) are not systematically 	<p>To provide a full picture of its performance, the EBRD should develop a robust self-evaluation system, validated by IEvD, that covers both standalone operations and operations under framework and enables an effective feedback loop.</p>

¹¹ Various, including page 51

Issue – why it needs to be changed	Suggestion – what needs to be changed
captured and included in the project cycle of the Bank.	

Suggestion 3: Systematically incorporate lessons and findings from both independent evaluation and evaluation by management in the Bank's decision-making process

94. EBRD is one of the few IFIs where lessons and insights from evaluation are not systematically incorporated in the design of new projects and policies, although situation improved somewhat in the last several years with regard to the Bank strategies.

Issue – why it needs to be changed	Suggestion – what needs to be changed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lessons from both independent evaluation and evaluation by Management are not captured and included in the project cycle of the Bank. It implies increased costs, missed opportunities and loss of stakeholder trust leads to the diminished accountability for learning. 	To improve the effectiveness of the Bank's activities while maximising efficiency gains, the EBRD should identify innovative and cost-effective channels to systematically incorporate lessons, insights and findings from both independent evaluation and evaluation by Management (including self-evaluation) into decision making process.

Suggestion 4: Strengthen learning sharing across departments, including from evaluation.

95. The evaluation highlights that the EBRD has an opportunity to harness the full potential of its collective knowledge, by enhancing its ability to learn and innovate. Evidence shows that voluntary cooperation across EBRD and between Management and IEvD may be strengthened while maintaining the independence of the latter. Establishing such collaboration networks would enhance the ability to leverage collective insights and experiences, ultimately fostering a more innovative and effective organisation.






Issue – why it needs to be changed	Suggestion – what needs to be changed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The lack of systematic and regular engagement and collaboration across departments, including evaluation, is significantly hindering organisational learning. 	To foster a stronger culture of learning and innovation, the EBRD should encourage, resource and incentivise all staff to learn, create, share and integrate knowledge, insights

Issue – why it needs to be changed	Suggestion – what needs to be changed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Without voluntary and consistent cooperation, the potential for positive change, effective knowledge transfer and improved public relations remains untapped. 	<p>and lessons more systematically into their work.</p>

ANNEXES

Annex 1. LKM ambition in SCF and its cascading into SIPs, sector and country strategies

To indicate the status of progress according to IEvD's assessment the evaluation team used a four-category traffic light system throughout this and the other technical reports:

 Complete <i>Indicates that the aspect is performing well and is on track to meet or exceed the targets.</i>	 Some progress <i>Highlights that the aspect is underperforming and requires significant improvements to meet the targets.</i>
 Significant progress <i>Signals that the aspect is progressing, but there are some concerns that may need attention to ensure targets are met.</i>	 Limited progress <i>Denotes that the aspect is critically underperforming, and urgent action is needed to address the issues and meet the targets.</i>
 Non-existent	

SCF 2021-2025 ambition on LKM

The coverage of LKM and use of evaluation in the SCF 2021-25 is as follows:

- In the SCF executive summary, LKM and use of evaluation are not among the three areas identified for strengthening EBRD's business model and toolkit – the areas so identified are mobilising finance, using donor resources, and policy engagement. The latter two areas are related to LKM – donor resources are used (at least to a limited extent) to support LKM, while policy engagement potentially generates useful knowledge that should be captured for learning. The SCF links policy engagement and LKM in its Executive Summary when it says *the Bank will build on the progress made with a view to strengthening policy impact at the sector and economy level, as well as strengthening its KM.* [●].
- More specifically, in the Executive Summary section on Implementing the SCF, it states that the Bank has embarked on a programme of strengthening its approach to monitoring, learning and evaluation to improve continuously its performance and impact [Â]. It further states in the SCF period, the Bank will take forward the conclusions of the Independent External Evaluation of EBRD's Evaluation System (the Kirk Report)¹² to establish the systems [Â] and culture [Â] to capture and analyse data, to communicate the

¹² Kirk, Colin. 2019. Independent External Evaluation of EBRD's Evaluation System (the Kirk report). Available at: <https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/evaluation-full-report.pdf>

Bank's impact and to support continuous learning[Â]. This the clearest statement in the SCF on LKM.

- This is further expanded on in the main text in section 3.3 where it states “all institutions improve their performance by learning actively from their own and others’ experience, disseminating those lessons widely and integrating them as appropriate into new project design [●]. Effective systems for monitoring, learning and evaluation (MLE) are essential for creating a robust feedback loop... To maximise its effectiveness in delivering transition impact, the EBRD needs a clear understanding of which activities are most successful and why [●].”
- Of note, the penultimate expected result of the SCF (Box 1 of the SCF, page 19) is that by 2025 the Bank will have strengthened its overall results framework, KM and the use of evaluation findings to improve the design and impact of operations [●].
- The SCF further notes that work on improving MLE [Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation] must be *continuous and constant*.
- To oversee implementation and to monitor progress the SCF notes the creation of a Senior Management Steering Group on Evaluation and two working groups – Self Evaluation and Results Management Working Group, and a Knowledge Management Working Group. The role of the former is self-explanatory while the latter was expected to *tackle a range of deficiencies in the Bank’s management of knowledge. These include better mapping of who knows what [●], strengthening the capture of lessons learned from the Bank’s operations and policy work [●], leveraging technology to disseminate knowledge supported by more user-friendly data [●] and promoting collaboration and knowledge sharing [●]* (page 54 of the SCF). Interviews indicated that both working groups contributed significantly, especially on the results management and self-evaluation which is still functioning. The senior management steering group ceased to function after 2021 as no further need was seen for it, something this evaluation does not agree with.
- The SCF accepts the Kirk report’s identification of the need to address a number of cultural, organisational and practical blockages to learning. The SCF states that *delivering on these changes will be a multi-year effort across the SCF period, requiring cultural change [●] and supported by effective incentives [●]* (page 54 of the SCF).
- Finally, in the MLE section, the SCF commits to strengthening IEvD which would prepare a medium-term strategy with performance metrics and scorecard, a communications strategy, and review the Evaluation Policy [●] (page 55 of the SCF).
- In section 2.5.4 of the SCF (pages 44-46) on policy engagement the Bank commits to enhancing its policy engagement during the SCF period through means that include aspects of LKM:
 - Consolidating knowledge, experience gained and lesson learning [●], especially in the core areas of EBRD’s distinct expertise.

- Systematic collection and management of the Bank's knowledge needs changes in practices. This includes better self-evaluation [●] and a better process of feedback of knowledge back to operations[●]. It also requires stronger systems to manage know-how and to make it available quickly and easily [●].
- Section 2.6 of the SCF, partnering for impact (pages 46-48) also has something relevant to say about LKM, including:
 - Exchanging diagnostic work and lessons learned with other IFIs [●].
 - Exchanging talent and expertise – in 2022, 12 IFIs agreed to reinvigorate their talent share programme that had existed since 2012 but been little availed of. Opportunities are listed on an Intranet page though these are few in number and mostly involved OECD only [●].
- More broadly on mobility, section 3.2.2 on people planning the SCF says a strategic priority will be Improving mobility and encouraging turnover by rotating staff internally and opening up more opportunities for external moves. This will unlock career opportunities for more junior staff across all the Bank's locations and support improved knowledge management and innovation within the organisation (page 51 of the SCF) [●].
- While resourcing the SCF is more specifically covered in the annual SIPs, section 3.2.1 of the SCF (page 51) commits Operations and Service Management to *improve the evaluation culture* [●] and *KM of the Bank* [●]. Section 3.2.2 on people management commits to *strengthening a culture of continuous learning* [●] (page 51).
- The SCF also makes a number of other commitments that are relevant to LKM and the use of evaluation findings. These include:
 - Improved data capture and availability [●], including sex-disaggregated data collection [●] (page 30 of the SCF), and improved technological resources so staff can stay current with emerging solutions [●], (page 34 of the SCF).
 - Some specific areas of staff skills enhancement such as gender training and toolkits [●]
 - Specific new skills, for example, will be needed with respect to a green, low-carbon economy [●] and leveraging the potential of digital technologies [●], both internally and for our clients (page 51 of the SCF).

Paid-in capital increase commitments relevant to LKM

The 2023 paid-in capital increase approved by the Board of Governors to help EBRD deal with the extraordinary circumstances brought about by the war on Ukraine came with a number of policy commitments. While none of these were of immediate and direct significance to LKM, a number of have implications for knowledge capture, lesson identification, and promotion of learning in particular. These include:

- Engage actively with other IFIs to learn lessons from implementation of the capital adequacy framework.
- Publication of Bank's first annual report on impact by the time of the Bank's 2025 Annual Meeting.
- Transition Impact assessment system fully grounded in well-articulated theories of change for each Transition Quality to strengthen evaluability and increase focus on the outcomes of the Bank's work.
- Data quality upgraded to enable better assessment of the impact of the Bank's work through allowing the aggregation of impact across projects within each quality, as well as at country and sector level.
- Review current procurement policy in 2024 and propose a revised policy in 2025 to reflect the Bank's evolving operational strategy and to strengthen the ability of clients to address unfair competitive practices as part of the evaluation of tenders with Guidance Notes updated as appropriate

Coverage of LKM in SIPs, 2021-2023

Strategy Implementation Plan 2021-23	Strategy Implementation Plan 2022-24	Strategy Implementation Plan 2023-25
<p>● = largely complete; ● = significant progress; ● = some progress; ● = limited progress</p>		
<p>This first SIP under the SCF 2021-25 was, as the document says, shaped under crisis due to the COVID pandemic. However, the SIP's Executive Summary states: <i>Recognising that only a learning bank can deliver on SCF ambitions, particularly with a fast-evolving external environment, the SIP also prioritises investing in self-evaluation [●] and results management [●].</i></p> <p>Further coverage of LKM and use of evaluation in the SIP follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2021, the focus and incremental budget allocations will be on three priority areas, one of which was self-evaluation [●] and results management [●]. Section 3.4 expands a little on this by adding that the IEvD 	<p>Unlike the preceding SIP that for 2022-24 does not make any general statement on the importance of being a learning bank in the Executive Summary. Rather, it states:</p> <p><i>Management took note last year of the need to improve institutional performance through a more integrated and systematic self-evaluation process. This year's SIP identifies how this will be taken forward. A self-evaluation programme, dedicated unit and tailored products will produce better feedback loops and learning, ultimately improving new project quality [●/● significant progress made on setting up a new self-evaluation framework, but still to demonstrated better feedback loops and learning]. The</i></p>	<p>The Executive Summary of the SIP makes no specific mention of LKM or evaluation.</p> <p>Section 2 reiterates the SCF commitment to <i>invigorate its culture and conduct of monitoring, learning and evaluation [●]</i>.</p> <p>Under the Green Economy section (3.2.1) of section 3.2 on progressing the SCF, the SIP states that the <i>Bank will prioritise support for the deployment of digitalised systems to generate, capture and translate results into operational and investment insights [●]</i>.</p> <p>The SIP notes the creation of a new Gender Academy in May 2022 and further on the continued sharing of knowledge on gender inclusion</p>

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<p>will also be strengthened [●] along with self-evaluation and results management [●].</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In section 6 of the SIP on people the following areas of focus for 2021 are stated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carry out a Bank-wide skills audit [●]. Upscale on-the-job learning opportunities through, for example, internal and external mobility schemes [●]. Establish itself as a learning organisation as key to attracting and retaining talent [●]. Develop knowledge management schemes to transfer knowledge across the organisation [●]. In terms of resource allocation for self-evaluation and results management, a further 5 full-time equivalents (FTEs) for new staff were budgeted for along with £0.5 million extra budget, but £2.5 million of the incremental staff costs and budget were expected to come from donor funds. Four of the FTEs and £0.4 million were allocated for self-evaluation and results management, and 1 FTE and 0.2 million to the IEvD for capacity building. Also related in part to LKM, the Office of the Chief Economist was budgeted to get two incremental FTEs and £0.2 million additional budget for 	<p><i>Evaluation Department will be closely involved.</i></p> <p>The SIP also reiterates the SCF statement that the effectiveness and impact of the Bank's policy engagement will be enhanced by <i>consolidating knowledge, experience gained, and lessons learned, especially in the core areas of EBRD's distinct expertise</i> [● variable progress across areas of the Bank's work]. More generally, in the SIP introduction it is acknowledged that <i>the Bank will not be fully successful without incorporating the lessons learned from its interventions in its work effectively</i> [● variable progress across areas of the Bank's work].</p> <p>Of relevance to LKM, in section 3.2.1 on the Bank's work on GET, the SIP notes <i>innovation also requires adequate staffing, trial and error, risk appetite, and the removal of internal barriers to "thinking outside the box"</i> [●]. IEvD notes that learning and applying knowledge also require these traits, which signifies a major cultural change.</p> <p>Section 3.2.2 of the SIP is about improving institutional performance through self-evaluation. This section is repeated in full in Error! Reference source not found..</p> <p>Section 5.3 of the SIP provides details on staff, work force planning and knowledge management. The following is relevant to the topic of this working paper.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The section starts by stating <i>The Bank cannot deliver its objectives without an adequate, suitably skilled and motivated staff. And, given the EBRD's role as a</i> 	<p>with other MDBs and international partners [●].</p> <p>In section 3.2.3 on digital transition, the SIP outlines what is being done/proposed to build digital competencies in staff.</p> <p>Section 3.2.4.4 of the SIP on knowledge management summarises progress made on the self-evaluation reform including the creation of a new Impact Team in VP3 <i>responsible for developing an integrated system of ex-ante assessment, monitoring, self-evaluation and knowledge management of the Bank's transition impact and to improve communication of their findings within the Bank and externally. The department now hosts the new self-evaluation function that is being established</i> [●].</p> <p>According to the SIP, progress has been made with the development of a new self-evaluation template, called a SPA, which is to be integrated into the Monarch platform [●].</p> <p>The SIP makes an important statement on the future trajectory of LKM in the Bank as highlighted in Error! Reference source not found.. Essentially, this can be interpreted as saying that the Bank is going to move slowly on LKM with the immediate focus being on IT 'solutions.'</p>

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<p>analysis of big data by means of machine learning and household, enterprise and banking surveys.</p>	<p><i>knowledge provider in economies where we invest and its ability to deliver considerable sectoral expertise to its clients, careful management of this resource – the Bank's knowledge – is of great importance.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Section 5.3.3 on developing staff talent has important elements of learning, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Continuation of the Skills Sharing Initiative, which provides informal short-term opportunities to staff across the organisation and increases the visibility of departments to them [●]. ○ Supporting the delivery of the GET 2.1 approach via masterclasses and dedicated learning opportunities for staff to raise awareness and understanding of climate change and climate action interventions [●]. ○ Development of a learning concept to support the delivery of the Digital Transition agenda [●]. ○ Introduction of measures to increase staff mobility [● while some work has been undertaken, there is limited mobility currently]. <p>In terms of resource allocation, the SIP confirms that self-evaluation gets 5 incremental FTEs and £0.8 million additional budget to oversee the launch and manage the new self-evaluation system or though later in</p>	

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	<p>the SIP it says 4 FTEs and £0.7 million for self-evaluation.</p> <p>The IEvD gets £0.1 million increase in direct costs cover the creation of an Evaluation Knowledge Management Unit, requiring an upgrade of an existing position and two new FTEs. Incremental costs of £0.3 million are offset by a £0.1 million decrease in consultancy costs and £0.1 million savings in underlying staff costs.</p>	

Sources: SIP 2021-2023 <https://www.ebrd.com/corporate-strategy/strategy-implementation-plan-202123.pdf>; SIP 2022-2024 <https://www.ebrd.com/ebrd-sip.pdf>; SIP 2023-2025 <https://www.ebrd.com/ebrd-sip-23-25.pdf>

SIP 2024-2026 on LKM

While this SIP is outside the period of this mid-term evaluation of the SCF, it is worth noting its provisions as these indicate what might be achieved in the balance of the SCF period regarding LKM. Important points are:

- Phase 4 of the Multi-Year Investment Plan will start in 2024, which is designed to improve user experience **and enhance knowledge management** for clients, stakeholders and other partners [emphasis added]. SIP 2024-26 confirms Phase 4 capex of £16.2 million with up to £3.8 million of investment proposed in 2024. As phrased in section 3.4.1 of the SIP 2024-2026, **this investment in KM seems to be more outward looking rather than improving internal LKM.**
- Section 2.4 of the SIP notes “A key component of the Bank’s delivery architecture is its capacity for policy engagement. It has long been recognised that it is the combination of policy engagement with investments that is at the centre of the Bank’s capacity to achieve and sustain systemic transition impact” [IEvD also notes that **policy engagement by itself, standalone or upstream policy dialogue can achieve and help sustain systemic transition impact in the absence of investments**].
- In section 3.4.1 on the Bank’s transformation agenda the SIP 2024-2026 states “At its heart is a cultural shift within the EBRD to embrace digitalisation and efficiency so that the Bank can remain a leading international financial institution, delivering on the current and future SCFs.” **This evaluation observes this may be more of an aspiration rather than resourced reality, notwithstanding some work going on regarding cultural transformation, but this is not central to the transformation agenda.**

- In section 3.4.3: Understanding impact and learning from self-evaluation (pages 36 and 37) **there are lot of well-meaning words, but there is no mention of further resources for making these aspirations become reality** (Table 5.6 indicates an incremental budget of £0.2 million for VP Policy and Partnerships), **nor mention of the culture change needed**. Among the **aspirational thinking** are the following statements:
 - Developing a clear understanding of the effectiveness of its interventions through self-evaluation also helps management incorporate lessons learned in the way the Bank approaches new projects and develops ideas and products that can better assist its economies where the Bank invests **[still to be demonstrated]**.
 - Learning from experience and understanding impact plays an important part in making organisations effective and strengthening institutional performance **[still to be realised]**.
 - Collectively, results from SPA, SPA validations [IEvD is piloting SPA validation in 2024 to test the viability of this product] and thematic activities will contribute to the wider KM system and spearhead the Bank's understanding of its development effectiveness **[still be realised]**.
 - The work will also contribute to the transformation agenda.
 - New empirical methods and novel technologies (for example, geospatial, generative AI) will be used to support these efforts.
 - The self-evaluation system will increase evaluative capacity within the Bank and increase the focus on impact **[still be realised]**.
 - The Bank will benefit from curated lessons and their dissemination **[still to be realised]**, bringing the understanding of impact closer to the heart of its operational activities **[still an aspiration]**.
 - By employing Foresight methods, including techniques such as horizon scanning, megatrends and scenario planning, **the Bank hopes [emphasis added]** to improve its strategic awareness, enhance policy and impact design and ensure short-term actions are consistent with long-term objectives.
 - An innovative and initiative-taking approach to thinking about opportunities for generating impact in future business is essential for the EBRD to exercise thought-leadership in the Impact community, including with impact investors **[IEvD agrees with this aspiration, but notes that resources will be needed to realise it]**.

Cascading of SCF LKM priorities into country and sector strategies


The latter two SIPs for the evaluation period confirm that “country and sector strategies operationalise the directions provided by the SCF by translating them into specific sets of actions and priorities tailored to the individual country or sector context.” **However, one might not expect country and sector strategies to reflect SCF priorities around LKM, which in the first instance is about developing EBRD’s internal capacity to be a knowledge and learning bank.** This unlike priorities for green transition or digital transformation for example, which likely have a direct bearing on country-level operations.

That said, it would not be unrealistic for country strategies to include a plan to capture knowledge from experience at the country level and to have a plan for delivering knowledge products and services as one of the tools in EBRD’s toolkit. Country strategies could conceivably identify knowledge gaps that if filled, could improve EBRD’s impact at the country and/or sector level. However, they don’t do this. Of course, **EBRD is delivering a range of knowledge products and services** through its policy dialogue and associated TC; its annual transition report and assessment of transition qualities, economic reports, business surveys, self-evaluations, diagnostic reports, along with a range of *ad hoc* reports and studies. **However, there is no overview of this work at the country strategy level and so no coordinated or strategic approach to its delivery, nor any idea of how this work can aid the generation of transition impact.** There is the **Results Snapshot** issued for each country once in a while. However, IEvD repeatedly indicated that **this is more of a public relations promotional product rather than a meaningful reflection on the impact achieved on the ground through EBRD’s activities, including learning from failure.**

A standard sub-section in EBRD country strategies in the section on implementation of the prior strategy is **Key Lessons and the Way Forward**. While hopefully contributing to the formulation of the current strategy, it is unlikely that this learning currently enters any KM system.

Cascading of SCF priorities into country and sector strategies happens to varying degrees with two caveats: (i) the SCF covers a fixed five-year period 2021-20 while country and sector strategies are approved on their individual five-year cycle so can be approved at any point before or during the SCF period (Figure 2 shows the strategies approved during the evaluation period); (ii) some of which is included in country strategies in particular comes from decisions already made, such that the strategy provides an explanation and justification of decisions already made, as well as providing a basis for making strategic choices on future country operations.

Figure 4: Approval year of country strategies in relation to the coverage of SCF 2021-2025



Source: EBRD Country strategies

Discounting countries where operations have ceased for varying reasons or there are special circumstances, 12 CoO had their most recent strategy approved in 2019 or 2020 and 4 countries had their most recent strategies approved in 2024 (up until July 2024). Countries with strategies approved prior to the approval of SCF 2021-2025 could still have included strategic priorities featuring in the SCF even if those priorities did not cascade from it. For those countries whose strategies were approved in 2023 and 2024, much has happened since approval of the current SCF, and it is likely that those strategies will reflect more current priorities where these have changed.

IEvD assessed the 16 country strategies approved during the evaluation period (see Figure 2) for coverage of LKM. It also reviewed 6 sector and other strategies approved during the evaluation period.¹³ Coverage of LKM was defined as contributions to priority 12 in Box 1 of the SCF – namely, delivery of a stronger overall results framework, KM and the use of evaluation findings to improve the design and impact of operations. **The analysis showed little coverage of the LKM priority in either country or sector/corporate strategies. Ten of the 16 country strategies made no mention of LKM while the 3 strategies for the Baltic countries all mentioned knowledge transfer across the countries as an objective. Where mentioned, statements were generic with no detail of how knowledge was to be created or transferred.** Among the sector/corporate strategies those for the ‘soft’ areas of Equality of Opportunity Strategy 2021-2024 and the Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality 2021-2025 gave somewhat more coverage to knowledge matters with some specifics as to what was to be done.

¹³ [Accelerating the Digital Transition 2021-2025](#), [Energy Sector Strategy 2024-2028](#), [Equality of Opportunity Strategy 2021-2025](#), [Financial Sector Strategy 2021-2025](#), [Mining Sector Strategy 2024](#), [Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality 2021-2025](#).

Annex 2. Proposed self-evaluation system in SIP 2022-2024

- The strategic purpose of the proposed new self-evaluation system is primarily to improve the EBRD's institutional performance, with learning from the Bank's experience and improved results management [being] further objectives [emphasis added here and below].
- Reorientation of self-evaluation towards useable learning and better institutional performance will be achieved by:
- A self-evaluation programme driven by demand for learning from Management and other stakeholders across the Bank.
- Focusing where learning is likely to be richest [IEvD notes that learning from failure is likely to be the richest, but this will require an acknowledgement of failure, something currently lacking].
- Delivering a range of new products for assessing EBRD results and impact, covering clusters of activities as well as individual projects, and including TC and policy dialogue.
- Complementing such new 'deep dive' products with SPA for all monitored projects reaching completion, thus strengthening accountability.
- Curating and regularly documenting the most relevant lessons and disseminating them through both push (active broadcast) and pull (easy accessibility).
- The self-evaluation system will provide a powerful feedback loop to origination on ways to improve the design and implementation of projects, strategies and work processes. For meaningful improvements in performance to be achieved, it will be vital that information and data on past performance are of high quality, which is an aspiration of the new system. Products and lessons from self-evaluation will be shared with the Bank's Management Committees and Independent Evaluation Department (IEvD), and Management will report key findings to the Board.
- The SIP outlined expected institutional arrangements though it did not turn out this way. According to the SIP, dedicated resources with the necessary evaluation expertise would be allocated in 2022 to create a new specialised Self-Evaluation Unit (SEU) which will form part of the Results, Impact and Knowledge Management team created under the VP3 reorganisation.
- Bankers will continue to assess individual projects and provide inputs to cluster and impact studies, with the SEU running the system, including coordinating and driving delivery of its products, curating and disseminating results, providing training and capacity building, and ensuring standards, consistency and quality. In practice, project self-evaluation is managed by Portfolio. Other evaluation products (if and when done) would be the responsibility of the Impact Assessments and Foresights Team in the Impact and Partnerships group, and the Office of the Chief Economist.
- The new SES will be launched in close co-ordination and co-operation with EvD. The speed of change and effectiveness of the new system will depend on resourcing, the success of pilots and IT support capacity.

Source: SIP 2022-2024, section 3.2.2

Annex 3. MOPAN assessment of EBRD

The MOPAN¹⁴ finalised the first assessment of the EBRD in 2024. Selected findings relevant to LKM are to follow. In presenting these findings, this evaluation report is not necessarily endorsing them though the issues at least are ones that the evaluation agrees are important. In the view of this technical report, the MOPAN assessment has a tendency to take stated intent as firm ambition rather than looking at actual delivery and achievement.

- The EBRD is updating its approach to self-evaluation, but challenges remain in supporting KM and learning and reporting on institution-wide results (page 28).
- More limited progress has been achieved in strengthening LKM. The Bank's planned demand-driven thematic and impact assessments are positioned to provide rigorous, evidence-driven learning on frontier challenges. However, less progress has been made in enhancing the dissemination of operational lessons through the revitalisation of internal databases and platforms (page 28).
- IEvD remains in the early stages of implementing an Evaluation Capacity Development to promote an enabling environment for evaluation (page 28).
- Beyond promoting the identification and dissemination of lessons, there is room for greater emphasis on cultivating and understanding demand drivers for evaluation products. Examples include identifying competencies and accountabilities for learning among Management and staff. There is a need to enhance data collection and understanding of dynamics around how the EBRD's operational lessons and knowledge are used by both internal and external stakeholders (page 28).
- As the EBRD progresses in renewing and consolidating its processes and implementing new systems, it should consider benchmarking the efficiencies realised and identify targets to drive further progress and learn lessons (page 31).
- Implement a systematic client and partner feedback mechanism to better understand how clients use EBRD's products, beyond lending (page 32).
- EBRD has relatively few tools in place to take stock of its actual contribution to country-level TI. More robust institutional metrics and reporting should reflect how EBRD's activities in CoOs are contributing to transition over time and possible operational lessons. (page 32).
- Realisation of expected non-financial additionality, often linked to TC, has not assessed systematically and, even when it is anticipated, it is sometimes not delivered. Existing data is insufficient to identify the scope of this challenge and learn lessons (page 32).

¹⁴ <https://www.mopanonline.org>

- EBRD's forward-looking self-evaluation system will include cutting-edge practices and impact assessments to meet demand for learning and anticipate trends (page 32). The evaluation considers that this statement is anticipating that this will be case whereas it is yet to be demonstrated.
- Create stronger institutional incentives for learning. There are opportunities to create stronger institutional accountability drivers for learning by enhancing progress toward integrating learning into job competencies, objectives and performance evaluation and establishing a dedicated institutional strategy and governance structure.
- Work is ongoing to strengthen LKM throughout the organisation. Following the 2019 Kirk Report and a critical IEvD Study, EBRD sought to strengthen LKM throughout the organisation via a phased approach, identifying this as an operational priority in SIPs [but generally not providing commensurate resources to match the ambition]. There is evidence that operational knowledge is used to inform operations through country diagnostics and is shared through Communities of Practice [now defunct], Policy Academy modules [unclear how much use this gets] and dissemination platforms [unclear what these are].
- Efforts to support LKM have predominantly targeted internal audiences rather than external users. Many existing initiatives support learning among external partners through knowledge hubs, video recordings of events and meetings and training e-modules. Yet there are limited means in place to examine their utility, uptake and use, particularly in the absence of client feedback mechanisms. There is limited evidence available on how EBRD's knowledge products are used by partners. Furthermore, organisational knowledge assets are not exploited systematically to offer greater value to clients. KM units have traditionally had limited scope to alter key operational processes nor a means of obtaining senior management-level sponsorship for such changes.
- EBRD demonstrates a clear commitment to results-based management throughout the organisation, supported by an enabling environment. [In making this judgment, the MOPAN assessment only presents evidence of statements of ambition contained in the two most recent SCFs]. A number of associated assessments in this section on performance management can be considered 'optimistic' or not supported by evidence. Again, there is a reliance on stated intent rather than actual delivery. Statements that this technical report considers should be qualified include:
 - EBRD demonstrates a clear commitment to results-based management throughout the organisation, supported by an enabling environment.
 - The SCF and the SIPs take into account results and operational lessons to inform their development.
 - Implementation progress and results are reported to the Board and are taken up to inform the development of subsequent strategies.

- Systems are in place to support results measurement in line with strategic priorities across projects.
- Whereas transactional TC (linked to an investment) is now monitored as part of Transition Impact Monitoring System (TIMS), standalone policy dialogue and TC (not linked to a particular transaction) are monitored through the Technical Cooperation Reporting System (TCRS). This system has now incorporated the Compendium of Indicators (COI), contributing to enhanced results monitoring aligned to EBRD's transition qualities. TCRS requires the identification of a results matrix, including expected results and target dates for achievement.
- Although country strategies identify objectives and results frameworks, there are opportunities to strengthen results management at the country level.
- Results achievement is supported by processes to identify and address underperformance. If a project is underperforming with respect to its TI quality, it is flagged for remedial action through TIMS. However, some stakeholders expressed concerns around the limited use of TIMS information for initiating corrective actions and for broader learning (this technical report certainly agrees with this last observation).
- EBRD has implemented important steps to create an enabling environment for results-based management.
- Overall, the independent evaluation system reflects good practice. However, efforts to enhance the self-evaluation function and learning and KM remain ongoing.
- Action is also being taken to enhance KM and learning from evaluation, although the uptake of operational lessons has remains relatively limited.
- Overall, this KPI has been rated as satisfactory, given that most operations appear to contribute to expected results.