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Abstract
Ten years of transition; Progress and patterns in transition; Macroeconomic
performance and prospects; Structural change in transition; The politics of
economic reform; Governance in transition; Competition, enterprise performance
and the investment climate; Market selection and the role of SMEs;
Restructuring large industrial enterprises.
Chapter 1: Ten years of transition
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was an occasion for hope. It also
inspired a sense of euphoria and triumphalism, and, for some, a belief that
the transition to a market economy and democratic society would be simple and
short. But ten years of experience has demonstrated that the transition is
complex and long and that the upheavals and stresses can be harsh. The
transition is not a steady march forward; there have been and will be setbacks
and crises along the way. But the disappointed hopes of some should not be
allowed to overshadow the remarkable achievements over the past ten years.
Most output in the region is now exchanged in a market system and produced by
the private sector. Free and fair elections in most countries have led to
democratic changes of government.
Taking stock of developments over the first decade of reform, Chapter 1
emphasises the need to complement liberalisation and privatisation with the
development of institutions and behaviour that support the functioning of
markets and private enterprise. This requires a strategy to strengthen
simultaneously the capacity and the accountability of the state by empowering
domestic constituencies with a stake in the process of reform. Liberalisation
and privatisation are not enough to promote these constituencies. Political
and economic competition are essential. The hope and challenge for the second
decade lie with the democratic process, the entry and expansion of new private
firms and continuing international integration.
Chapter 2: Progress and patterns in transition
Over the past decade, two broad patterns in transition have emerged. In the
more advanced countries, rapid liberalisation and sustained macroeconomic
stabilisation have laid the basis for gradual institutional change. These
changes have been driven by the demand from enterprises and voters and have
been shaped by the process of European integration. In the less advanced
countries, progress in liberalisation and privatisation has been slow and
uneven and stabilisation has been jeopardised by the persistence of soft
budget constraints. The business environment for new enterprises also remains
deeply flawed.
Two issues dominate the second decade of transition. First, the less advanced
countries in south-eastern Europe and the CIS need to redouble their efforts
to complete liberalisation and lay the basis for macroeconomic stability. In
this task, they face serious challenges, confronted with unfavourable legacies
from the previous regime's central planning and the need for significant
structural change to introduce free markets. To help ease this constraint,
governments should reduce obstacles to the growth of new private enterprises,
which can provide new employment opportunities and reduce the costs of
adjustment. Second, the process of institutional change in response to demands
from the private sector cannot be taken for granted. The state must play a
strong and leading role in developing market institutions. Transforming the
state remains a pressing challenge for all the transition economies.
Chapter 3: Macroeconomic performance and prospects
The variation in reforms across countries is mirrored in their macroeconomic
performance over the first decade of transition. The severity of initial
structural and macroeconomic imbalances has not only influenced the depth of
the initial recession in the transition process but also affected the
political feasibility of rapid reforms. Even among countries with unfavourable
starting points, however, there is clear evidence that rapid liberalisation
and stabilisation, as well as progress in small-scale privatisation, have
yielded significant benefits in terms of stronger growth in output.
For liberalisation and stabilisation to be sustained, they must be
complemented with institutional changes that support markets and private
enterprise. The chapter reviews recent cases of reform reversals caused by the
lack of underlying structural change in the enterprise and financial sectors.
These flaws have also impeded reform of public finances and undermined fiscal
stability. Over the medium term, the transition economies are, in principle,
well-placed for rapid growth because of their high level of skills and their
potential for rapid improvements in productivity following the introduction of
new technologies. This potential has begun to be realised in part of the
region, primarily in central and eastern Europe. The main challenge for the
south and east of the region is to break out of the vicious cycle of policy
instability and poor governance.
Chapter 4: Structural change in transition
A crucial link between progress in transition and growth in output is
structural change. Economic reforms were widely expected to lead to
substantial reallocation of resources, rectifying the distortions inherited
from central planning. While causing temporary economic and social upheaval,
this reallocation would underpin the subsequent recovery. A structure of
economic activity comparable to market economies has been achieved more
rapidly in countries that have quickly liberalised markets and trade than in
those with gradual and uneven levels of reform.
The pace of structural change has differed widely in various areas in the
economy. Although the adjustment in employment across sectors has been uniform
and swift, regardless of the pace and durability of reforms, other areas have
been much more sensitive to the extent of progress in reform. These include
the reorientation of trade towards the international economy, the development
of the private sector and the expansion of key infrastructure services, which
are all fundamental to high growth. If structural change is to give rise to
growth, reforms aimed at strengthening these sectors should be a priority. The
chapter also shows that the financial sector – which is necessary for growth
and stability over the long term – has shown little development so far in
response to financial reforms. Regulatory practice will have to be
strengthened and competition in finance needs to be promoted if this sector is
to support the transition in the next decade.
Chapter 5: The politics of economic reform
Within the constraints provided by differing initial conditions, the political
environment has been the major factor influencing policy choices during the
first decade of transition. It is commonly believed that successful reform
requires a stable, strong government of technocrats committed to reform, but
the experience of the last ten years of transition has contradicted this view.
A high degree of political competition, rather than a government insulated
from electoral pressures, has promoted reform in many countries. This has
partly been achieved by weakening the power of vested interests to gain
influence over government and to distort reforms.
Four key political factors influencing successful and consistent reforms are
identified. First, deposing the old elite at the initial stages of transition
has been instrumental in promoting economic reforms, which have not only
fostered markets and private enterprise but also weakened the strongly vested
interests from the previous regime. Second, the degree of social cohesion
around the goals of transition at an early stage is critical for sustaining
the reform process through the inevitable pains of adjustment and the change
of governments. Third, to maintain the momentum for reforms, it is essential
to constrain the power of vested interests to block reforms that threaten to
undermine their gains from only partial reforms and distorted markets.
Finally, the incentives associated with external alliances can encourage
governments to take difficult policy choices and to undertake institutional
reforms. The chapter provides a cross-country comparison of the relationship
between the structure of the political system and economic reforms, and
analyses in detail the politics of privatisation in several less advanced
countries.
Chapter 6: Governance in transition
One of the main goals of transition has been to transform the role of the
state in the economy – to persuade it to adopt a form of governance based on
support for markets and private enterprise rather than plans and commands. Yet
despite the considerable achievements in liberalisation and privatisation in
the first decade of transition, the quality of economic governance varies
widely across the region, as revealed by the survey of over 3,000 enterprises
in 20 countries – the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey –
which was undertaken for this Report. Surprisingly, this variation is not a
direct result of the extent of economic reforms that have been adopted. In
fact, enterprises in both the most advanced and least advanced countries tend
to have relatively favourable assessments of the quality of their governance,
while those in countries with partial reforms report a higher level of
governance problems. A key to explaining different assessments of governance
across the region lies in the extent to which the state is subject to
"capture" – or undue influence – by vested interests. The survey provides a
unique opportunity to measure and compare the extent of state capture across
the region and to investigate its effects on the overall quality of governance.
The survey also shows that the initial hope that privatisation would create
the foundation for improved governance and transform the ties between the
state and firms has not been fully realised. The impact of privatisation on
the quality of governance depends strongly on the extent of state capture.
Firms in transition economies continue to interact with the state in a complex
web of costs and benefits that differs across countries and types of firms.
Enterprises spend considerable resources in lobbying state officials, paying
bribes and adjusting to state interference. In return, they receive benefits
in the form of subsidies, soft finance, tax advantages and the tolerance of
arrears. A key challenge remains the effective "depoliticisation" of firms
through further market reforms and measures to constrain state capture by
private interests.
Chapter 7: Competition, enterprise performance and the investment climate
A successful transition must unlock and encourage deep restructuring,
innovation and growth by enterprises, but in many countries economic reforms
have yet to yield strong responses. This chapter examines how reforms
influence the performance of firms, using data from the enterprise survey.
Importantly, the analysis considers differences in reforms both at the country
level, in terms of the pervasiveness of soft budget constraints and
assessments of the investment climate, and at the level of enterprises
themselves, in particular the degree of competition faced by firms and their
origin and ownership.
The analysis reveals the strong influence of competition and hard budget
constraints on deep restructuring and product innovation and concludes that
these initiatives contribute significantly to the growth of firms. Growth
tends to be recorded much more rapidly in new private firms than in other
types of firms, even after allowing for their relatively small size. However,
firms that operate in countries with unfavourable investment climates tend to
grow more slowly. The analysis underscores therefore that competition, hard
budget constraints and a favourable investment climate are vital for the
restructuring and growth of enterprises.
Chapter 8: Market selection and the role of SMEs
New private firms tend to grow more rapidly than other types of firms. The
emergence and growth of these firms occurs most strongly if the market
"playing field" is level. One indicator of the strength of the process of
market selection in the enterprise sector is the extent to which firms with
increasing productivity grow and those with falling productivity decline. An
analysis of this process reveals sharp differences among transition economies.
The survey reveals that the main obstacles to the growth of SMEs are
anti-competitive practices and corruption, followed by taxes and business
regulations. A priority for the next decade of transition is to embrace
competition policy that focuses on reducing barriers to business start-ups,
introducing measures to combat corruption and crime and hardening the budget
constraints on declining industrial enterprises.
Chapter 9: Restructuring large industrial enterprises
The restructuring of existing enterprises remains one of the greatest
challenges of the transition. Progress in liberalisation and privatisation has
been extensive in the past ten years, but enterprise restructuring –
particularly in the industrial sector – has not. The mix of reforms adopted by
many transition economies has led to rapid industrial downsizing in terms of
employment and capacity, but it has not led to quality investment and the
development of new products and production methods. A combination of
political, fiscal and social constraints has made the task much more difficult
than anticipated and the reforms adopted in many countries have been
ineffective.
The way forward remains challenging. Changes in ownership and management will
be crucial to break up the vested insider interests and to initiate deep
restructuring. The chapter reviews various options that could be used to
attract strategic outside investors, including debt forgiveness, creditor-led
restructuring, "ring-fencing" in joint ventures, and the hiring of external
management expertise.
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