Transcripts

President press conference on the EBRD strategy in Uzbekistan, Friday 14 March 2003

JEFF HIDAY, Head of Media Relations: Good afternoon. This is a briefing on our new Uzbek strategy. Mr Lemierre will make a few comments, and then take questions.

MR LEMIERRE: The Board approved a few days ago, on 4 March, what we call the new Strategy for Uzbekistan. It is a strategy for two years.

I would just like to make a few comments about the key principles of the strategy. The unanimous position of the Board - there has been total consensus on the document - is: first, constructive engagement vis-à-vis Uzbekistan, and not isolation; and second, that this constructive engagement should be based on clear messages. The first clear message is that Uzbekistan's ability to expand its economy and reduce poverty is and will be directly dependent on progress on the political front and on economic reforms.

For the first time in a Bank strategy, the Board has structured our messages in the form of benchmarks, of which there are seven. Three are in the political sphere and four are in the economic sphere. You will see that they have been made very clear in the document. They are being called "benchmarks" and they are explicit in the document and in the press release.

In the political sphere, there are three benchmarks: political openness and freedom of the media; more open political processes, with a specific point made on the role of NGOs, registration of NGOs, and freedom and independence of NGOs; and thirdly, human rights, torture - and there is a clear mention of the UN report on torture and the need for clear answers and implementation of the recommendations.

There are four economic benchmarks. The first is the foreign exchange system; the second relates to fair competition, free trade and privatisation; the third is the improvement of the banking sector; and the fourth is management of public utilities, particularly in the energy sector.

The Board pays great attention to these benchmarks, and considers that they are key: for the first time in a strategy, the Board has decided to be very explicit about benchmarks. This is the clear implementation of constructive engagement, which means setting benchmarks and saying they are the key elements that will make progress possible and help us to attract investment and to invest ourselves. Without this, there will be no progress.

The Bank is taking a strong view on the review of the progress made on these benchmarks. A country strategy is a strategy for two years. You will see that we are insisting on an enhanced review of progress after one year as part of the process of updating the strategy. There is a normal process of updating for all our countries of operations, but the Board wanted to expressed a strong commitment to a specific review of progress in one year's time.

Having said that, you will see in the strategy the Bank's views about its operations. There is clear mention of the operational priorities of the Bank, which are to support private investment and entrepreneurship, mainly through three elements: support of private investors, SMEs; strengthening of financial institutions, which is a key priority for financing the real economy; and the financing of critical infrastructure - transport, municipal services and energy.

Another key element is mentioned in the strategy and at the end of the press release. It is the investment made in the past by the Bank. The Bank has invested €642 million in Uzbekistan. Last year we invested €34 million. This demonstrates that, without clear progress, the level of investment in Uzbekistan could remain at a low level, which will not enable Uzbekistan to unlock its potential.

I would like to add one further comment. This is a strategy; it is the vision of the Board about the operations of the Bank. In the last few weeks there have been new incidents concerning journalists in Uzbekistan. Four were put in jail, three were quickly released, but some concern has been expressed by journalists about their ability to do their job. We have made it very clear to the Uzbek authorities that these incidents are not in line with the benchmarks.

This strategy has been endorsed by the 62 shareholders. That will certainly be the basic message the shareholders will have. The Uzbeks know this. It is clear that the Annual Meeting provides a very important opportunity to get the answer to these questions.

That is where we stand today. I have been talking about the difficulties we are encountering, because they are exactly the type of questions about which we have to send very clear messages.

You have the document. It is a long one. You are familiar with the Bank's strategy documents. There is always a recommendation of two or three pages. This is the key element of the strategy. Now I will take questions.

MR ROBINSON: There does seem to be a bit of a resemblance between your policy of constructive engagement and Resolution 1441. You have been constructively engaged for a long time. You have spent a lot of money. What results do you have to show that constructive engagement works in this particular case? At what point on this strategy here do you decide that it is not working? What will you do if you come to that conclusion?

You mentioned the incident with the journalists, and I agree it is significant that some were released, but there have been two other things. Perhaps we should have a conference every month, at which point we might solve the problem. There have been two other big developments in recent weeks, and one is the physical closure of the Uzbek frontiers. I have just been up to see them; they are closed. The IMF, which has a similar policy of constructive engagement, was basically told to go away.

In the light of these two things, is there still an argument for going ahead with constructive engagement, and indeed, for going ahead with the Annual Meeting, or is it now not the time to actually say that, in view of these developments, constructive engagement does not work and we should not have a conference there?

MR LEMIERRE: You will see this in the strategy. There has been progress over the last ten years. You cannot say there has been no progress at all. We have reached a situation where we would like to see more progress. We see where the difficulties are in moving forward. We know what they are. They are political and economic difficulties.

Should we be engaged? My answer is clear: that is the position of 62 shareholders, 60 countries and two institutions. Their unanimous position is that is the way to go.

May I add one thing? For two countries in the region we have taken a different position. There are two countries where we have said we cannot engage. Those countries are Belarus and Turkmenistan. This is how you need to understand constructive engagement. In two countries we maintain a very small window, which is SME financing, but otherwise we do not engage. It is a different approach.

There has been a little progress in Uzbekistan and we can see there could be more and we have set clear benchmarks for the path Uzbekistan should follow to make progress.

What will happen? Clearly, the Annual Meeting is a moment of strong messages, using this approach. It is an approach which is known, it is on the table, and there is the Annual Meeting. If I can say it in a different way, this strategy shows that there is no blindness. It is not an endorsement. It says there are difficulties, and the wording is very explicit. I and all the shareholders hope that during the Annual Meeting answers will be given. This is a first meeting point, and it is crucial to do this. That is why we wanted to express the fact that there will be a clear progress review in a year's time.

What will happen? We shall see. We shall see what developments there are. The message is that the developments must be according to that track and not to another. We will review the situation and we shall see what has happened and draw conclusions. Either it works well, investment will come in, and we shall give more support or it does not, and there will be a new discussion in the Board.

It is a very structured process for conveying the messages clearly.

SYLVIE LANTEAUME (Agence France Presse): Is this the first time you have decided to review a strategy after one year?

MR LEMIERRE: No. This has happened before, I think in one case. What we are saying here is that our strategy is for two years. Normally each year, in between, we have an update of the strategy. But the Board wished to convey the message that it will be a serious review of progress. The message is we shall not wait for two years to do a review; in one year we shall look at the situation.

MS LANTEAUME: Again, these are just words. What will change after one year if there is no progress? What can you do?

MR LEMIERRE: We can do what we can do. Once more, we have various options. One option is that there are improvements. If there are, we shall say so. We hope there will be more investment, and because there is more investment, we can do more; or we shall say the contrary, and then the Board can take a different approach. Again, we have taken a different approach in different countries.

PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): You are talking about clear messages and setting clear benchmarks. Do you accept that the very fact that the Annual Meeting is taking place in Tashkent raises the possibility that the messages will become muddled? You are trying to deliver a clear sign to the government that what they are doing does not satisfy you at all, and yet we have to go back to the old chestnut of events like this historically being seen as stamps of approval, as rewards for good behaviour. All around the world cities and countries compete to host major international events which they believe will attract international attention, and they are almost universally seen, when the event is hosted in these countries, as a form of approval by the institution and by its shareholders. I know that you intend to go in and make a clear point that that is not the case, but surely you have to accept that there is a very high risk that that message will not get through.

MR LEMIERRE: One comment, which is a personal one. I cannot see how that could be the case given that the strategy has been made public just before the Annual Meeting. The position of the shareholders of the Bank is known - it is in the Bank's strategy, which is being published before the Annual Meeting. I can understand what you are saying and what many people say. But when we are very clear about our concerns before the Meeting, when they are agreed on by all the shareholders of the Bank, when there is consensus, and when our concerns are made public before the Meeting, it is not as you say. You could have probably had some doubt were it not for our strategy, or our messages.

RAYMOND LLOYD (Freedom Review): I must congratulate you on this. As you probably know, the World Bank is holding its next meetings in Dubai and in Singapore, and they have not put out a document like this. Both of them are authoritarian countries, and there could have been lots of countries other than Dubai and Singapore that the World Bank and IMF could have chosen for their meetings.

I see there are two good things in this. One is that Freedom House has set up a local office, and the other thing, which I have a lot more detail on, because the New York Times wrote a big article on this, is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which became allied to al-Qa'ida and certainly to the Taliban. The threat from that seems now to be diminished, so one would hope that if there is not this external threat, internally the government might feel safer and be prepared to democratise more than it would have without this external threat.

MR LEMIERRE: One point on what has been said about trade and borders. Yes, this is part of the message and the debate, and it is clear that the regional, or cross border, dimension is a key element of the strategy. We think trade, and local trade in particular, is very important. That is one of the messages from the political point of view. It is a message from our point of view only because we are ready to support trade with our facilities, and this type of debate will, I hope, take place during the Annual Meeting. That is a message which must be delivered in central Asia. May I say that this applies not only to Uzbekistan; it is a problem for the whole region. Trade between the countries in the region is much too low and should be developed. I have no doubt about this. It is a key element of what we are saying. But the message is not only for Uzbekistan; it is true of the other countries.

MR ROBINSON: Could I just make an observation on the question of messages? In Uzbekistan, the television, the radio, is totally state-controlled. The printed media hardly exists. The message which you want to deliver, and will deliver, you can safely deliver so far as the regime is concerned, because that is not the message which will be transmitted to the Uzbek people. The message that the Uzbek people will receive is the image of Mercedes cars, big flags, the streets will be blocked as delegations move up to the conference and so on, and it will be presented on television as another in a perpetual series of triumphs of President Karimov, and the whole world has come to Tashkent to pay obeisance. That is what the messages will actually be.

How do you justify in reality - forget about justification. How does one actually get across the message that you want to get across under those circumstances?

MR LEMIERRE: We have made sure that the speeches at the Annual Meeting will be broadcast live.

MR ROBINSON: On Uzbek radio and television? Really? As they are delivered? Fantastic. That is very important.

MR LEMIERRE: That is what I call constructive engagement.

MR ROBINSON: Absolutely. Which speeches? All speeches?

MR LEMIERRE: What will certainly be done is the three opening speeches: President Karimov's, the Chair of the Board of Governors, Clare Short, and my speech.

MS LANTEAUME: (No microphone)

MR LEMIERRE: We understand your point. What we are trying to do is to make accessible television and radio, with the translation done by the EBRD of the speeches - not President Karimov's; that will not be translated. But at least my speech needs to be translated, and we shall do that. That is what we are trying to do. Let us be humble. But I agree with you. Mercedes, Peugeot, Audi or Jaguar is not real life. Words can be good.

PAUL HANNON: The status of this is that you have secured agreement?

MR LEMIERRE: We have an agreement.

PAUL HANNON: On the state-owned TV and radio stations?

MR LEMIERRE: Yes. Broadcast live, translation done by us.

DAVID CHANCE (Reuters): You are used to grading things. You grade economic transition and legal transition on a scorecard. If you had to grade Uzbekistan on these seven issues, what sort of score out of ten would you give them? You use five on your legal transition indicator, so five would be adequate. So how would you grade them broadly on their progress so far, in the political sphere and the economic sphere, and also, when you conduct your review and you are going to have measurable progress on benchmarks, then what sort of level would you expect them to reach to show the kind of measurable progress that would indicate continued engagement by the Bank?

MR LEMIERRE: We can make that type of comparison. It is difficult with the political sphere, because if you compare with central Europe, you have a difficulty. You must compare with CIS countries and central Asian countries.

I would say that Uzbekistan is in a position where they can make progress. They can understand that if they take some clear decisions, and these are the benchmarks, they could improve. You can understand that we do not have benchmarks for Turkmenistan, for instance. There they have the potential to make progress, to move, to understand the problems. We think that a good test is what their answer will be to the recommendations made by Mr van Boven and the UN report on torture. If you want my personal opinion, this is a very important point. You may have read Mr van Boven's report. It has not yet been discussed by the Commission. But I have met Mr van Boven, and we have had a long discussion to understand the situation in Uzbekistan, and it was a very interesting discussion. He is a man of experience and wisdom, and he is an honest man, trying to make an honest assessment.

His first recommendation is very important. He says before all the technical reform on human rights, what is key is a clear condemnation of torture at the highest level in Uzbekistan, to give guidance. This is part of the debate I mentioned a few minutes ago, where you have certain practices by some police forces, maybe at a high level. You have a group of people, more modernising people, who understand that this is not the way to move forward. You see what is happening: a push like this, and then they change, because some people know what is going to happen. Van Boven is totally right, and that is the reason why we say this in our benchmarks. We think - and I think personally - that it is very important that Uzbekistan first agrees with the recommendation of Mr van Boven. It would give a clear message to the Uzbek society that this is not normal practice. That should probably come from the top, and from a few key persons in Uzbekistan. This is exactly the kind of recommendation which is clear. When you talk to a good man like Mr van Boven, with huge experience in these matters, he says it is crucial. It is exactly what you should ask for. If the message is not given in a clear, public way in the country, people think they can do it. This is the type of achievement they could have.

When you ask how I rate them, I would say that there are these difficulties, but we think they can make progress. Will they? That is in their hands. What would the test be? Points like this; clear starting points.

Let us be clear: progress will take time. We should not dream. We should not say there will be huge progress in six weeks or six months, but a clear strong commitment to start new processes, then there will be technical work, then there will be investment, then there will be work with the UN, technical assistance to train people and so on. At least they know where they want to go. That is a crucial part of the process. I can say this to you. This is what I have said to the Uzbeks.

MR HIDAY: Could you clarify that your comments about your meeting with van Boven are on the record.

MR LEMIERRE: On the record, I can say that there are difficulties, and when we compare countries, Uzbekistan is in a situation where progress can be made, we believe. How do we measure this? One example is that there is a clear recommendation by Mr van Boven on torture, and the first is a clear condemnation of these practices, and that could be done.

MR HANNON: The date of the report on the website is February 4th, I think, or thereabouts, where it makes this recommendation, which means it has been public for over six weeks. How long does one wait before President Karimov makes this public condemnation of torture? Is it a year? Is it two years? Or are you expecting something before the Annual Meeting? Or at the Annual Meeting? How soon? The report, as you know, has very detailed case studies of exactly what has been going on, and it makes very clear recommendations. Surely the decision on this is pretty black and white.

MR LEMIERRE: I do not want to have a debate with you about this, but I think it was later than that. I would be surprised if it was 4 February. It is much later, a few days ago.

MR HIDAY: That is the date on it, but I do not think it was actually made public until just a week or ten days ago.

MR LEMIERRE: No. It is very recent. That may be the date on the document. I have read the report he gave to me then, but I am sure it was not public at that time.

MR HANNON: The timing issue still leaves the question.

MR LEMIERRE: Yes. There is a clear moment: the Annual Meeting of the Bank. I would say the sooner the better.

MR LLOYD: I think there are also two other reasons why Uzbekistan, perhaps more than any other country in that area, needs to be engaged. One is it is the most populous country, easily, and the other, it has the greatest historical and architectural culture, and so it has enormous potential for tourism, for people coming from abroad. It has that potential. Perhaps Kyrgyzstan has it in a different way, but certainly Uzbekistan has it more than any other country in that part of the world.

MR LEMIERRE: That is the reason why regional dialogue is key. These countries are 10 or 11 years old. They need, as we say in the strategy, to promote a dialogue between themselves and not to fear being open with their neighbours. This is part of the issue.

LOUISA KHUDAIKULOVA (BBC World Service): A letter was published by several independent journalists in Uzbekistan. I quote. They partially hold you responsible for the acts of violence against journalists if you go ahead with your Annual Meeting in Tashkent, if your benchmarks for the Uzbek authorities do not work.

MR LEMIERRE: I am not so sure that is what it says in the letter, at least, what I have read.

MS KHUDAIKULOVA: It is in Russian. I can give you a copy. They say that EBRD will be partially responsible for acts of violence if they go ahead with their meeting in Tashkent.

MR LEMIERRE: They are talking, as I understand it, about the period after the Meeting. No?

MR KHUDAIKULOVA: No. They mention several acts which happened recently, and then they say that EBRD will be partially responsible. Is your organisation ready to take partial responsibility for these kinds of things?

MR LEMIERRE: The EBRD is not responsible for this. Just the contrary. I said what I think a few minutes ago. These cases are serious, and we take them seriously.

MR LLOYD: Let us see what happens in Evian with the G8 meeting.

MR LEMIERRE: I think the points which have been made are good ones. We have to consider them. They are certainly not in line with the benchmarks, and we have to make this very clear. I have made it clear to the Uzbek authorities, and that is a clear point we have to make during the Annual Meeting, that this is not in line with the benchmarks, that we need to support a sound and fair approach to respect for human rights. The international community is not responsible for these cases.

MR ROBINSON: Can I come back to van Boven's recommendation that there be a clear condemnation of torture from the top? Clearly, at this stage you still have some leverage; once you go away, the leverage is going to be less. Has there been as part of your pushing and shoving an attempt to get such a specific statement from President Karimov in his broadcast and televised speech to the nation?

MR LEMIERRE: I have made the point very clearly to the Uzbek authorities.

MR ROBINSON: How did they respond?

MR LEMIERRE: The Annual Meeting is at the beginning of the May.

MR ROBINSON: So the answer is they have not replied yet.

MR LEMIERRE: They say they are working on it. I can understand that. But it is clear that the point has been made.

MR ROBINSON: If the President does not make a clear reference to torture and a clear condemnation of torture, will you make one yourself?

MR LEMIERRE: I think you should come to Tashkent to find out what I say. You can easily understand that these seven benchmarks are my position. They will be clear elements in my own comments.

MR ROBINSON: You have the whole of the Board behind you, behind the condemnation of torture, and the whole world wants torture to stop. You have this great opportunity and power to say it clearly, and if the President does not, and you do not, I think people will want to know why.

MR LEMIERRE: I am sure I will not be the only one to do it. I am sure the Chair of the Board of Governors will do it too.

MR HANNON: If she is still in office!

MR LEMIERRE: You made the comment. I did not.

There will be a Chair. I did not say Ms Short. I said the Chair of the Board of Governors. There will be one, and this was unanimously approved. This is the view of the Board, and of the Governors.

MR LLOYD: The Chair will be from Britain in any case.

MR LEMIERRE: Yes.

MR CHANCE: The last time we met you talked about a series of promises and commitments from the Uzbek authorities on access for NGOs from Uzbekistan, from the region, and you were encouraged - that is a strong word, but you did appear to be pleased that there had been at least a positive response, a willingness to engage from the Uzbek authorities. Has that continued? Are you still encouraged by their willingness to entertain NGOs?

MR LEMIERRE: We have a clear commitment from President Karimov on this, a written commitment, confirmed by the Uzbek authorities. We have very frequent discussions with them on these questions. This has been confirmed. We know they have been working on the implementation of these principles. We are monitoring the situation very closely. There is a commitment which has been confirmed. We have agreed with the NGOs that they will tell us if there are difficulties.

The other commitment we have is the live broadcast of the speeches. These were two very important elements of openness and clarity about the messages - for people to be able to come, and for the messages to be known by the people. That is crucial for us.

MR CHANCE: And the meeting commitment, which is something you talk about in monitoring the situation. Is that in place?

MR LEMIERRE: Yes. We have been talking with the Uzbek authorities about this. This is of course very important. We have been talking to the NGOs and the Uzbek authorities. We are present in the country; we have an office there. We have strong discussion and agreement with the ambassadors in Tashkent. May I add one thing, which is the strong position taken by the Board about the review. The institution is firmly there. We are not leaving. That is not the case; just the contrary.

MR HANNON: Can I ask you about the reading of their sensitivity to criticism? When the Saudis were under the microscope after the events of September 11th, they hired a very expensive public relations firm and took out a lot of advertisements in US newspapers. Obviously, the Uzbek government does not have as much money as the Saudis. It is difficult to know from here - I do not know what it is like in Uzbekistan - but one does not get the impression that they are terribly concerned. They certainly do not actively try and disagree or debate these points. It is a cushion. Everybody says nasty things about them, and they just sit there. What that suggests is that they do not really care, and if they do not really care, then there really is not any leverage. There is not any foreign investment in there. The group that is in control perhaps does not really connect its economic interests or its future with the prospect of foreign investment, so what possible damage can it be to them if it does not arrive? Do you have any confidence that there is a strong enough body of modernisers who do see some point in improving the country's image?

MR LEMIERRE: That is a very good question. I may have a partial answer to your question, mainly through two elements. The first one is that there is an understanding and we are trying to increase this understanding, about the fact that the present economic policy is going nowhere. This is a joint effort with the IMF and the World Bank and the shareholders, to say, "Look, you can have a vision of your economic development, but you cannot develop an economy on its own. You need to be more open, you need to allow investment, you need to improve trade, etc." This is exactly the work the IMF does in the Article 4 mission. They would like Uzbekistan to make progress on Article 8 of the IMF. This is what they do in their dialogue, this is what we do, and this is the purpose of the strategy: to increase this, to show that the future of Uzbekistan can be better if it is based on more openness. You understand what I mean. We are working hard to try to convey this message. It is understood. It has to be spread and implemented.

The second element is more political perhaps. I think Uzbekistan is a very young country, ten years old. Formerly, Uzbekistan was part of the USSR. But Uzbekistan wishes and needs to be part of the international community, for security reasons. This is very important in the political dialogue with Uzbekistan.

I will give one example, which is a small part of the answer to your question. I am not an expert in UN procedures, but I understand that when there is a desire or a need for a report on torture, a country can oppose the visit of the UN rapporteur. They did not do that. Some countries say no, and there is no report at all. That is not the position they have taken. They have agreed. Why have they taken that position? Perhaps somebody said it would be better for them. That is the role of the dialogue with them. It is very interesting, and I am being cautious because I am not totally familiar with these procedures. It is an anecdote which can be part of the answer to your question. They could have said no. "We are being criticised on torture. No report. Mr van Boven, no. Stay where you are." They said yes, and they know very well what it is about.

My message to them is that they have done well in accepting the UN report. This is a good step. We cannot always criticise. It was a good decision to accept the mission. Now they need to be consistent and respect the mission. That is probably one answer to your question. We know they are paying some attention to this, because they accepted it. What we have to do is to enhance the approach. To a certain extent - and I am not sure the comparison is totally valid - accepting an Annual Meeting of the EBRD, with free speech, is part of that process too. Part of this is that Uzbekistan wishes, needs to be part of the international community. There are many questions for them behind this.

MR LLOYD: What you say reminds me of Mauritania asking for the Anti-Slavery Society to come, because they know that they have a slavery problem and they have asked for advice from Anti-Slavery International as to how to combat it, whereas India, for example, refuses to have Amnesty, certainly going to Kashmir. I would agree that Uzbekistan, having got in the UN Special Rapporteur, would like to do something, and probably as much as anything else, we have to help them. There are here in Britain and in Denmark really important international organisations helping the victims of torture, and perhaps it would be a good idea to give those organisations - I do not know whether they have branches in Uzbekistan yet - assistance to help the victims of torture, and also help the torturers as well.

MS LANTEAUME: In the political assessment you mention the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is a terrorist organisation with links to al-Qaeda. You just spoke about the security concerns of Uzbekistan. How will you balance the needs of security for the Annual Meeting with the openness you want for people to express themselves? I suppose there will be very tight security.

MR LEMIERRE: Yes, probably. I do not know. I think openness is key, and debate is key. I think you can make the two compatible. It is not so complex to have a normal level of security, but to be open. People must be able to come, to receive a visa, to take part in the discussion.

MS LANTEAUME: So you are leaving Uzbek security in charge of the security of the EBRD meeting?

MR LEMIERRE: It is their country. You cannot say to them that they are not in charge. What is key is that we know who wishes to come and who will come. That is the best transparency we can bring. People can call us, register, and we know. The Uzbek authorities cannot block this. That is key.

MR LLOYD: How many NGOs do you expect to register?

MR LEMIERRE: I do not know. It is too early. We do not know yet. Certainly the NGOs in Uzbekistan, in the region, we would like to have, and we are inviting many of them. We are organising panels to which we invite representatives of NGOs, Human Rights Watch and so on to come and take the floor, open the debate with various people. We have taken initiatives to invite many of them. We hope more will come. From experience, we know registration and so on is done some weeks before, but not exactly now.

MR LLOYD: Do you expect to have a panel on the economic advantages of human rights protection?

MR LEMIERRE: We are organising one panel about questions related to legal aspect, democracy and human rights, yes, with people representing these concerns.

MR ROBINSON: Do you have a fallback venue?

MR LEMIERRE: Yes. Where? Here.

MR ROBINSON: It is here, is it?

MR LEMIERRE: It is London.

MR ROBINSON: If the war begins, presumably Tashkent will not be people's favourite menu. This will presumably give you an opportunity to say, actually, this is the alternative venue.

MR LEMIERRE: That is two questions.

MR ROBINSON: Let me put the question more clearly. Firstly, is there an alternative. Secondly, what would be the point at which you would decide that the alternate venue would be the one?

MR LEMIERRE: Do we have a fallback position? Yes. It is here. If we cannot, for various reasons, have the meeting in Tashkent, it will be here.

Second, the decision is taken to go to Tashkent, so the decision must be reversed by the 62 countries, the 62 shareholders. It is a decision taken by the Governors. If a decision is taken, it must be based on the assessment of the situation. We do not know that today.

MR LLOYD: I had a non-refundable fare to the World Bank meeting which was called off. I just hope this will not happen for Tashkent.

MR CHANCE: You present the Board opinions here as unanimous opinions. Can you discuss some of the gradations of opinion that were expressed both on the strategy and on Tashkent itself? Presumably not everybody spoke with one voice. There are countries which historically have had greater concerns about human rights than others. You can see the divisions in other fora. Can you give us some indication of the kind of discussion that went on between countries? Were there people who wanted to be very much forceful on this strategy and on links to human rights?

MR LEMIERRE: No. I think it was a strong consensus. If there were differences, they were nuances, but nothing major. It was a very strong, common line about what I have said, constructive engagement and no isolation; about the key message, which is the same view about the benchmarks, and I can say this on the record, even the wording of the benchmarking was not debated. There was strong consensus. There was a strong view also about what we will do after the two years, following the progress review after one year. There is a strong, common view. It is a strong consensus.

MR LLOYD: Can I ask a practical thing? What is the visa going to cost us? To Russia it cost us £10, to Bulgaria £40, and so on. Do you know what it is going to cost us for Uzbekistan?

MR CHANCE: The Embassy of Uzbekistan has a very good website. If you put in "Uzbekistan Embassy in London," you will find it.

MR LLOYD: Do you know what the cost of the visa is? That is what I am asking.

MR CHANCE: About £40.

MR ROBINSON: $40, and if you get it on arrival, it is $60.

MR LEMIERRE: It is cheaper here.

JULIA ZILBERMAN (EBRD press officer): Yes, it is cheaper to get it in London than on arrival.

MR ROBINSON: In theory it is $45 but actually they charge you £45. - What is the proportion of the EBRD loan portfolio to Uzbekistan which is devoted to the private sector, and what is the proportion to public? You are committed to 60:40, I believe.

MR LEMIERRE: It is in the strategy document.

MR ROBINSON: Does the [€] 160 or [€] 180 million of lending to the state banks for on-lending to private SMEs count as lending to the private sector because of the final destination?

MR LEMIERRE: Yes, it must be. It is on page 10, table 1, Uzbekistan, "Overview of Bank's activities to date." You have private 54 [%], public 46 [%]. So it is slightly more public than in the global approach of the Bank.

MR ROBINSON: But would be even more public if you accounted for lending to public, i.e. state-owned banks for on-lending to SMEs, as public. Is that always counted as private?

MR LEMIERRE: This is crucial from our point of view. This is a facility for the private sector. The bank is a tool. We monitor the facilities very closely, so we know very well what is being done. We do not make policy lending. We finance projects. We know where the money goes. It is crucial that you count it as private financing, because it is to support the SMEs or the micro-finance companies. This is crucial for us.

MR ROBINSON: That is always the case, is it, not just in Uzbekistan? You always count that lending, even if it goes through state banks, as private lending.

MR LEMIERRE: We may count it as public in the case of such a loan if we have a sovereign guarantee. I know of one case in Kyrgyzstan, where many years ago we created a facility with a bank to finance SMEs with a sovereign guarantee. In that case it is public, but I have taken a decision to withdraw the sovereign guarantee, because I think we have to take the full risk of financing SMEs in the Bank and to reduce the burden on the budget of a poor country. In that case, it could be public. In fact, it has been suppressed.

MR LLOYD: With the closure of the land borders, does that mean that if, for example, I were to go to Kyrgyzstan, I would no longer be able to travel overland to Tashkent?

MR LEMIERRE: No. You can. The problem on the borders was more with Kazakhstan, because part of the debate was that people living in Tashkent used to go to Kazakhstan to buy goods and come back - shopkeepers in the bazaar and so on - and they decided to close the border. They have called for a meeting with the Kazakhs and they are working on the problem. If there are difficulties with Kyrgyzstan, they are more of a political nature. Kyrgyzstan trades a lot with Uzbekistan.

MR ROBINSON: Apparently there are police controls along all those borders now, both with Kyrgyzstan and with Tajikistan.

MR LEMIERRE: Yes, but the recent decision to close the border for trade reasons was with Kazakhstan.

MR ROBINSON: Principally, but whatever the reason, the effect of the police borders stifles trade as well, so it is effectively a trade barrier.

MS LANTEAUME: Can I change the subject completely: do you have any news about your building and your possible move?

MR LEMIERRE: I do not know what the latest news you have is.

MS LANTEAUME: The situation in the City is very bad.

MR LEMIERRE: We are talking on the one hand with British Land, the owner of this building; on the other hand, with Canary Wharf. With British Land, it is rent. With Canary Wharf it is to buy. We are talking to them. They are working. I hope I will receive their final offer soon. But we are in the process. I do not have that yet.

MR LLOYD: Canary Wharf shares went down dramatically again today, did they not? So it is time to buy.

MS LANTEAUME: They have a problem with the FSA.

MR LEMIERRE: Why? What is the problem?

MS LANTEAUME: Because there was an arrangement between the tenants, some big tenants, and one of the bosses of Canary Wharf. So there is an inquiry now.

MR LEMIERRE: With the FSA?

MS LANTEAUME: Yes, with the FSA, and anyway, Canary Wharf has a big problem of empty space. There is a lot of empty space.

MR LEMIERRE: That is the time for negotiation.

MS LANTEAUME: Yes, that is why I asked.

MR LEMIERRE: That is what we are doing. We have taken various steps. It is in their hands to come back to us, and then we shall compare the two - and it is always a challenge to compare a rent option and a buy option - and try to make the best decision. But we are equally open-minded and equally eager to see good final offers.

MS ROBINSON: Is it possible, say, to rent for two years, and then when they are really desperate….

MR LEMIERRE: We are smiling, because we are negotiating a good price. Otherwise it is not a very good situation.

MR LLOYD: Do not wait until Crossrail is built!

MR ROBINSON: You will wait a long time!

MR HIDAY: Thank you for coming. One last thing: If you could mind the embargo, we would greatly appreciate it.